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**HOROLOGICAL
HISTORY**

PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL GRAMMAR

First Published
1884

This Edition Published
2024

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
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ISBN: 9798325707308 (paperbound)

PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL GRAMMAR

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HISTORY**

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- L. BENLOEW, Aperçu général de la Science comparative des Langues.
- A. BEAUZÉE, Grammaire générale.
- E. B. CONDILLAC, Grammaire générale.
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Introduction

ON entering upon the study of a foreign idiom, and comparing its grammar with that of his native tongue, the student can not help noticing the many features which they both have in common. Should he happen to know another language, he will, by further comparison, find these points of resemblance to become less in number, and less again with every succeeding language, until at last there will remain but few which are common to all, and these form the principles of all grammars—in other words, of *General Grammar*.

Grammar may be viewed in two lights: either as a collection of rules which have to guide us in the expression of thoughts, or as an investigation of the principles of language deduced from the nature and relations of the ideas to be represented. In the first light, grammar, applying only to the facts of one language, is called *special*, and constitutes an *art*; in the second, grammar, proposing to explain the nature of words and their relations by the nature and relations of the things which they represent, and also to account for the mode of using them by a consideration of the mental operations on which it depends, is said to be *general*, because it embraces the principles of all languages; it then constitutes a *science*, being founded on the universal and immutable laws of external nature and of the human mind. There are thus as many particular grammars as there are languages; whereas there is only one general grammar—one science of language.

The art of grammar gives the rules for using the materials of one language; the science of grammar gives the rationale of all the facts of language. A knowledge, therefore, of its principles is of the utmost importance to any one who, in the acquisition of a foreign idiom, or in the use of his own, aims at something more than a merely practical acquaintance; for although the power of philosophizing about language in general by no means implies the power of using any language in

particular, yet it is evident that the student must obtain a much better insight into the form and structure of a language if he can reason about it, and learn its grammar by induction, than if he has to receive all his information from dry and uninteresting rules. One might be acquainted with the results of many profound inquiries in all the various sciences, but unless he has also learned the principles thereof, his understanding will not reach much higher than that of an uninstructed workman. He who has studied mechanics will see at a glance more of the meaning of any piece of machinery than the mere mechanic who for years has been working the very best of engines under the directions of the ablest engineer; and even as the former will be able to judge for himself as to the merits of any piece of mechanism, whatever be its origin or nationality, so the student who knows the theory of language will find no difficulty to account for the rules of any grammar in particular, nor will he be puzzled or astonished by exceptions, of which he understands the nature and the propriety. In a word, he will be able and induced to make his own investigations, draw rules from examples, learn grammar from language, and not, as is too often attempted, try to learn language from grammar.

In this country it is not rare to find students who are familiar with one or more foreign idioms; indeed, with some rare exceptions, modern languages now form everywhere part of the regular course of collegiate studies, side by side with the ancient classics. By the analysis and comparison of these languages, including the vernacular which above all should engage their most serious attention, students may learn to discover the general principles of grammar, in contradistinction to those which are peculiar to each language with which they are acquainted, and thus lay a foundation for the most interesting researches in philology and mental philosophy. Rising above the intellectual facts which constitute the art of grammar, they should study its definitions, investigate its generalities, and seek in the formation of ideas, and in the operations of the mind, the universal and immutable laws which govern languages, and which constitute the science of grammar. To those whose mind is capable of such a study it will lay open a large field on which to exercise their strongest reasoning powers, whereas to those especially who prepare for the learned professions such a course will prove of the highest practical importance. But even to him whose linguistic knowledge is confined to his native and

one other language only, and who in these idioms feels far enough advanced to look for further progress to a more systematic study of their grammars, we still advise a previous perusal of the following brief chapters on the nature of language, and the principles that govern the expression of thought both in speaking and writing.

The Origin of Language

LANGUAGE, in the proper sense of the term, signifies the expression of our ideas and their various relations by certain articulate sounds which are used as the signs of those ideas and relations. By articulate sounds are meant those modulations of the voice, or of sound emitted from the thorax, which are formed by means of the mouth and its several organs—the teeth, the tongue, the lips, and the palate. In a more general sense, language is sometimes used to denote all sounds by which animals of any kind express their particular feelings and impulses in a manner intelligible to their own species.

Nature has endowed every animal with powers sufficient to make known those sensations and desires with which it is necessary, for the preservation of the individual or the continuance of the kind, that others of the same species should be acquainted. For this purpose the organs of all vocal animals are so formed as, upon any particular impulse, to utter sounds of which those of the same species instinctively know the meaning. The summons of the hen is instantly obeyed by the whole brood of chickens; and in many others of the irrational tribes a similar mode of communication may be observed between the parents and the offspring, and also between one animal and another. But it is not among animals of the same species only that these instinctive sounds are mutually understood. It is as necessary for animals to know the voices of their enemies as those of their friends; the eagle's scream puts every bird to flight, and the roaring of the lion is a sound of which, previously to all experience, every beast of the forest is naturally afraid. Between these animal voices and the language of men, however, there is very little analogy. Human language is capable of expressing ideas and notions which, there is every reason to believe, the brutes can not conceive. The voices of the latter seem intended by nature to express, not distinct ideas, but only such feelings as it

is for the good of the species that they should have the power of making known; and in this, as in all other respects, these voices are analogous, not to speaking, but to weeping, laughing, sighing, groaning, screaming, and other natural and audible expressions of passion or of appetite. Another difference between the language of men and the voices of brute animals consists in articulation, by which the former may be resolved into distinct elementary sounds or syllables; whereas the latter, being for the most part inarticulate, are not capable of such a resolution: for though there are a few birds which utter sounds that may be divided into syllables, yet each of these birds utters but one such sound, which seems to be employed rather as a note of natural music than for the purpose of giving information to others; and hence, when the bird is disturbed or agitated, it utters cries which are very different and have no articulation.

A third difference between the language of men and the significant cries of brute animals is that the former is the result of art, while the latter is derived from nature. Every human language is learned by imitation, and is intelligible only to those who either inhabit the country where it is vernacular, or have been taught it by a master or by books. But the voices of brutes are wholly instinctive, and intelligible to all the animals of the species by which they are uttered, though brought together from the most distant countries on earth. That a dog which had never heard another dog bark would notwithstanding bark himself, and that the barkings or yelps of a Chinese dog would be instinctively understood by the dogs of this or any other country, are facts which have been ascertained and do not admit of doubt. But there is no reason to imagine that a man, who has never heard any language spoken, would himself speak; and we all know that the language of one country is unintelligible to the natives of another country, where a different language is spoken. Indeed, it seems obvious that, were there any instinctive language, the first word uttered by all children would be the same; and that every child, whether born in the midst of society or in the desert, would understand the language of any other child, however educated or however neglected. Nay more, we may venture to assert that if the use of such a natural language were superseded by a more refined and artificial idiom among the educated, traces of it would remain sufficiently strong to enable every one to express his

natural and most pressing wants among all men of his own or any other country, whether barbarous or civilized.

It being thus apparent that there is no instinctive articulated language, it has become an inquiry of some importance, how mankind were first induced to fabricate articulated sounds, and to employ them for the purpose of communicating their thoughts. Children learn to speak by insensible imitation; and when advanced some years in life, they study foreign languages under proper instructors. But the first men had no speakers to imitate, and no formed language to study. By what means, then, did they learn to speak? On this question only two opinions can possibly be formed: either language must have been originally revealed from heaven, or it must be the fruit of human invention.

The latter opinion is strongly supported by Monboddo in his very learned and able work on the “Origin and Progress of Language.” But he candidly acknowledges that, if language was invented, it was of very difficult invention and far beyond the reach of savages. Accordingly he holds that, though men were originally solitary animals, and had no natural propensity to social life, yet, before language could be invented, they must have been associated for ages, and have carried on in concert some common work. Nay, he is decidedly of opinion that before the invention of an art so difficult as language, men must not only have herded together but also formed some kind of civil polity, have existed in that political state a very long time, and acquired such powers of abstraction as to be able to form general ideas. But it is obvious that men could not have instituted civil polity, or carried on in concert any common work, without communicating their designs to each other; and he therefore suggests four ways by which this might have been done before the invention of speech, namely: 1. *Inarticulate cries*, expressive of sentiments and passions; 2. *Gestures*, and the *expressions of countenance*; 3. *Imitative sounds*, expressive of audible things; and 4. *Painting*, by which visible objects may be represented. Of these four ways of communication, it is plain that only two have any connection with language—inarticulate cries and imitative sounds; and of these the author abandons the latter as having contributed nothing to the invention of articulation, though he thinks it may have helped to advance its progress. It is, therefore, inarticulate cries only which, according to him, have given rise to the formation of language; and this theory he supports with a great deal of learning and ingenu-

ity, adducing in the course of his reflections the opinions, not only of heathen philosophers, poets, and historians, but also of Christian divines, both ancient and modern.

The prevailing opinion of modern philosophers, however, does not agree with the account of the origin of language as a human invention, and rather considers it as a series of mere suppositions hanging loosely together, and the whole suspended from no fixed principle. The opinions of Diodorus, Vitruvius, Horace, Lucretius, and Cicero, which are frequently quoted in its support, are in their estimation of no greater authority than the opinions of other men; for as language was formed and brought to a great degree of perfection long before the era of any historian with whom we are acquainted, the antiquity of the Greek and Roman writers, who are comparatively of yesterday, gives them no advantage in this inquiry over the philosophers of the present times. That the first men sprang from the earth like vegetables, no modern philosopher has ventured to assert; nor does there anywhere appear sufficient evidence that men were originally savages. The oldest book extant contains the only rational cosmogony known to the ancient nations; and that book represents the first human inhabitants of this earth, not only as reasoning and speaking animals, but also as in a state of high perfection and happiness. Moses, setting aside his claim to inspiration, deserves, from the consistency of his narrative, at least as much credit as Moschus, or Democritus, or Epicurus; and from his prior antiquity, if antiquity could on this subject have any weight, he would deserve more from having lived nearer to the period of which they all write. But the question respecting the origin of language may be decided without resting on authority of any kind, merely by considering the nature of speech, and the mental and corporeal powers of man.

Those who maintain it to be of human invention, suppose men at first to have been solitary animals, afterward to have herded together without government or subordination, then to have formed political societies, and by their own exertions to have advanced from the grossest ignorance to the refinements of science. But this is a supposition contrary to all history and all experience. There is not upon record a single instance, well authenticated, of a people emerging by their own efforts from barbarism to civilization. There have indeed been many nations raised from the state of savages; but it is known that they were

polished, not by their own exertions, but by the influence of individuals or colonies from nations more enlightened than themselves. The human mind, when put upon the proper track, is capable of making great advances in arts and sciences; but if any credit be due to the records of history, no people sunk in ignorance and barbarity has ever shown sufficient vigor to discover that track or to conceive a state of things different from that in which they are living. And if we see the aboriginal tribes of this continent continue, as there is every reason to believe they have continued for ages, in the same unvaried state of barbarism, how is it imaginable that people so much ruder than they as to be ignorant of all language should think of inventing an art so difficult as that of speech, or even to have a conception of the thing? In fishing, hunting, building, navigating, and the like, they might imitate the instinctive arts of other animals, but there is no other animal that expresses its sensations and affections by arbitrary articulate sounds. And since it is asserted that, before language could be invented, mankind must have existed for ages in large political societies, and have carried on in concert some common work, we may well ask, if inarticulate cries and the natural visible signs of the passions and affections were modes of communication sufficiently accurate to keep a large society together for ages, and to direct its members in the execution of some common work, what could have been the inducement to the substitution of an art so novel and so difficult as that of language?

Let us, however, suppose that different nations of savages set about inventing an art of communicating their thoughts which experience had taught them was not absolutely necessary; how came they all, without exception, to think of the art of articulating the voice for this purpose? Inarticulate cries, out of which some think language was fabricated, have indeed an instinctive connection with our passions and affections; but there are gestures and expressions of countenance with which our passions and affections are in the same manner connected. If the natural cries of passion could be so modified and enlarged as to be capable of communicating to the hearer every idea in the mind of the speaker, it is certain (and the wonderful perfection to which the language of the deaf-and-dumb has arrived proves it) that the natural gestures could be so modified as to answer the very same purpose. It therefore seems strange that among the several na-

tions who invented languages not one should have stumbled upon fabricating visible signs of their ideas, but that all should have agreed to denote them by articulate sounds. It is in vain to urge that articulate sounds are fitter for the purpose of communicating thought than visible gesticulation; for though this may be true, it is a truth which could hardly occur to savages who had never experienced the fitness of either; and if, to counterbalance the superior fitness of articulation, its extreme difficulty be taken into view, it must appear little less than miraculous that every savage tribe should think of it rather than the easier method of artificial gesticulation. Savages, it is well known, are remarkable for their indolence, and for always preferring ease to utility; but their modes of life give such pliancy to their bodies, that they could with very little trouble bend their limbs and members into any positions agreed upon as the signs of ideas. This is so far from being the case with respect to the organs of speech that it is with extreme difficulty, if at all, that a man advanced in life can be taught to articulate any sound which he has not been accustomed to hear. Few foreigners who come to this country after the age of thirty ever learn to pronounce English even tolerably well; an American of that age can hardly be taught to utter the French sound of the vowel *u*, or the guttural articulation of the Spanish *x*; it is almost impossible to imitate a brogue; and of the solitary savages who have been caught in different forests, we know not that there has been one who, after the age of manhood, learned to articulate any language so as to make himself readily understood. The present age, it is true, has furnished instances of deaf persons being taught to speak intelligibly by skillful masters molding the organs of the mouth into the positions proper for articulating the voice; but who was to perform this task among the inventors of language, when all mankind were equally ignorant of the means by which articulation is effected? In fact, experience informs us that men who have not learned to articulate in their childhood never afterward acquire the faculty of speech but by such helps as savages can not obtain; and, therefore, it would seem that if speech was invented at all, it must have been either by children who were incapable of invention, or by men who were incapable of speech. But these two opinions are equally absurd and untenable; for while the organs are pliable, there is not understanding enough to frame the conception of an articulate language, and by the time that there is understanding, the organs have

become too stiff for the task. Reason, therefore, as well as experience and history, suggest that mankind in all ages must have been speaking animals—the young acquiring the art by imitation, and our first parents being born with the power of naming whatever came under their observation, and urged to use that power by immediate inspiration.

Such are the reasons and considerations upon which is based a theory adopted by the best and deepest inquirers into the spontaneous generation of language, to which they all ascribe an origin at once divine and human, without pretending to solve a question which from its very nature must of necessity remain a mystery forever. Others, not satisfied with attributing to man the inborn faculty of speech, which, even under inspiration, he may have used at first but very imperfectly and only gradually improved, in the same way as men inspired nowadays improve their skill by practice and experience, have argued that there actually was an original language, the words and forms of which were communicated to man by divine inspiration. To this it is objected by those who suppose it to be a human invention, that if the first language was communicated by inspiration, it must have been perfect, and held in reverence by those who spoke it; in other words, by all mankind. A vast variety of languages, they say, have prevailed in the world, many of which, there is every reason to believe, are lost; and of those which remain, the best and most cultivated are too imperfect to be the work of God. If different languages were invented by different nations, all this, they think, would naturally follow from the mixture of these nations; but what, they ask, could induce men possessed of one perfect language of divine origin, to forsake it for barbarous jargons of their own invention and in every respect inferior to that with which their forefathers had been inspired? As there is something plausible in the argument, it may be interesting to inquire into the validity of the objections raised, for if they can not confute the more extreme views which they oppose, they certainly can not disprove the simpler and more generally adopted views set forth upon the subject.

Truly, perfection is the stamp with which everything of divine origin is marked; but change and decay, as well as propagation and death, appear to be the constant rules by which this perfection is maintained in all nature. Everything created is subject to accidents which may suspend and even terminate the natural course of its existence. The infirmities which befall individuals do not argue against the exalted ori-

gin of the race, nor can the vicissitudes of nations be laid to any original imperfection of the species. Such vicissitudes of nations, however, bear a direct relation to those of their language. Every degradation or improvement, whether individual or national, is always immediately shown by corresponding changes in the language. Languages, as nations, have their origin, growth, and decadence, and give birth to others which in their turn prosper, decline, and become extinct; and as the fortunes of both always keep pace together, we can not argue from the diversity of tongues or from their alterations that the first language was not perfect, any more than we can prove the degeneracy of part of humanity to be due to an original imperfection of the race. The first language, if given by inspiration, must in its principles have had all the perfection of which language is susceptible; but in order to render it available to all mankind, throughout the course of the world's progress, it is necessary that this perfection should lie deeper than in the mere vocabulary, which from the nature of things would in the beginning not possibly have been very copious. The words of a language are either proper names or the signs of ideas and relations; but it can not be supposed that the All-wise Instructor would load the memory of man with names for objects he had not yet seen, much less with words to set forth feelings which were not yet stirring within him, combinations which he had not yet made, relations of which he was not yet conscious. It was sufficient that a foundation was laid of such a nature as would support the largest superstructure which men might ever after have occasion to raise upon it, and that the power of naming, bestowed upon them, included the method of framing words by composition and derivation. This would long preserve the language radically the same, though it could not prevent the introduction of different dialects in the different countries over which men spread themselves. In whatever region we suppose the human race to have been originally placed, the increase of their numbers would, in process of time, either disperse them into different nations, or extend the one nation to a vast distance on all sides from the nucleus or principal settlement. In either case they would everywhere meet with new objects, which would occasion the invention of new names; and as the difference of climate and other natural causes would compel those who removed eastward or northward to adopt modes of life in many respects different from the modes of those who traveled toward the west or the south, a vast

number of words would in one country be fabricated to denote complex conceptions, which must necessarily be unintelligible to the body of the people inhabiting countries where those conceptions had never been formed. Thus would various dialects be unavoidably introduced into the original language, even while all mankind remained in one society and under one government. But after separate and independent societies were formed these variations would become more numerous, and the several dialects would deviate farther and farther from each other, as well as from the idiom and genius of the parent tongue, in proportion to the distance of the tribes by whom they were spoken.^[1]

If we suppose a few people either to have been banished together from the society of their brethren, or to have wandered through trackless forests to a distance from which they could not return (and such migrations have often taken place), it is easy to see how the most copious language must in their mouths have soon become narrow, and how even the offspring of inspiration must have in time become so deformed as hardly to retain a feature of the ancestral root whence it originally sprung. Men do not long retain a practical skill in those arts which they never exercise, and there are many facts to prove that a single man cast upon a desert island, and having to provide the necessities of life by his own ingenuity, would soon lose the art of speaking his mother tongue with fluency. A small number of men cast away together would indeed retain that art somewhat longer; but in a space of time not very long, it would in a great measure be lost, if not by them, certainly by their posterity. In this state of banishment, as their time would be almost wholly occupied in hunting, fishing, and other means within their reach to support a wretched existence, they would have very little leisure, and perhaps less desire, to preserve by conversation the remembrance of that ease and those comforts of which they now found themselves forever deprived; and they would of course soon forget all the words which in their native language they had used to denote the accommodations and elegancies of polished life. This, at least, seems to be certain, that they would not attempt to teach their children a part of a language which in their circumstances could be of no use to them, and of which it would be impossible to make them comprehend the meaning; for when there are no ideas, the signs of ideas can not be made intelligible. From colonies such as this, dispersed over the earth, it is probable that all those nations of savages have

arisen whose condition has induced so many philosophers to imagine that the state of the savage was the original state of man; and under such degradation we may well suppose that, from the language of inspiration, whatever may have been its original perfection, must have unavoidably sprung a number of different dialects, all extremely rude and narrow, and retaining nothing of the parent tongue, except perhaps some indistinct trace of the names of the most conspicuous objects of nature, and of those wants and enjoyments which are common to all humanity. The savage state has no artificial wants, and furnishes few ideas that require terms to express them. The habits of solitude and silence incline a savage rarely to speak; and when he speaks, he uses almost always the same terms to denote different ideas. Speech, therefore, in this rude condition of men, must be as narrow as it may be various. Every new region, and every new climate, suggests different ideas and creates different wants, which must be expressed either by terms entirely new, or by old terms used with a new signification. Hence must originate great diversity, even in the first elements of speech, among all savage nations; the words retained of the original language being used in various senses, and pronounced, as we may well believe, with rude and various accents.

When any of those savage tribes emerged from their barbarism, whether by their own efforts or by the aid of people more enlightened than themselves, it is obvious that the improvement and copiousness of their language would keep pace with their own progress in knowledge and in the arts of civil life; but in the infinite multitude of words which civilization and refinement add to language, it would be little less than miraculous were any two nations to agree upon the same sounds to represent the same ideas. Superior refinement, indeed, may induce imitation, conquest may to some extent impose a language, and extension of empires may melt down different nations and different dialects into one mass; but independent tribes naturally give rise to diversity of tongues, and it does not seem possible that they should retain more of the original language than the words expressive of those objects with which all men are at all times equally concerned. The variety of tongues, therefore, the copiousness of some, and the narrowness of others, furnish no good objection to the divine origin of language in general; for whether language was at first revealed from heaven, or in the course of ages invented by man, a multitude of di-

alects would inevitably arise as soon as the human race had separated into a number of distinct and independent nations.

Such are in the main the arguments that have been set forth on either side of the question, without assisting much in solving the problem. Many idle speculations are due to that indolent philosophy which refers to a miracle whatever appearances in the natural or moral world it is unable to explain, and many more exhibit a sensitive dread of admitting in the matter of language and its origin any agency not human. It seems incumbent, however, on those who reject the spiritual doctrine on account of its making reference to supernatural or, as they term it, unknown agency, to furnish us with some account of the origin of our species by which they can explain events, no more miraculous than the origin of language, with which they are intimately connected. Until these events, which certainly did take place, can be understood in a different way from that in which we find them recorded in the Mosaic account, we may, it seems, rationally adhere to the whole of the same testimony, as involving the operation of no other causes than such as account, at least as well as any other thus far suggested, for the phenomena under consideration.

"Language," says Whewell, "is often called an utterance of thought; but it is also the instrument of thought, or rather it is the atmosphere in which thought lives, a medium essential to the activity of our speculative powers, although invisible and imperceptible in its operation, and an element modifying, by its qualities and changes; the growth and complexion of the faculties which it feeds. In this way the influence of preceding discoveries upon subsequent ones, of the past upon the present, is most penetrating and universal, although most subtle and difficult to trace. The most familiar words and phrases are connected by imperceptible ties with the reasonings and discoveries of former men and distant times. Their knowledge is an inseparable part of ours; the present generation inherits and uses the scientific wealth of all the past. And this is the fortune, not only of the great and rich in the intellectual world, of those who have the key to the ancient storehouses, and who have accumulated treasures of their own; but the humblest inquirer, while he puts his reasonings into words, benefits by the labors of the greatest. When he counts his little wealth, he finds he has in his hands coins which bear the image and superscription of ancient and modern intellectual dynasties, and that, in virtue of

this possession, acquisitions are in his power, solid knowledge within his reach, which none could ever have attained to if it were not that the gold of truth, once dug out of the mine, circulates more and more widely among mankind.”^[2]

The invention of an art by which language, from a simple means of communication, became the key to all knowledge, was *writing*.

Origin and Progress of Writing

THE art of drawing ideas into vision, or of exhibiting the conceptions of the mind by legible characters, may justly be deemed the noblest and most beneficial invention of which human ingenuity can boast; an invention which has contributed more than all others to the improvement of mankind.

Although we have but very vague data in respect to its origin, the most probable supposition, as well as that which has the greatest amount of direct evidence in its favor, is that writing always began by being *figurative*. Thus the sun was indicated by a *circle*; the moon by a *half circle*; a serpent by an *undulating line*, etc. Man is essentially imitative. Even as he repeats the sounds he hears, so he is inclined to draw the objects he sees; and, even in his most uncivilized state, he displays a faculty of imitation, which enables him to delineate objects and communicate information by rude pictures or representations. Thus, a man who had seen a strange animal, plant, or any other new object, for which he wanted a name, would have been almost mechanically led to illustrate his description by signs; and if they were not readily comprehended, by a rude delineation in the sand, on the bark of a tree, on a slate, a bone, or on such materials as first presented themselves. The permanency of these outlines, and of the objects on which they were traced, naturally suggested the hint of recording events and of conveying intelligence; and when reflection had taught to express such an idea as murder, for instance, by the image of a man stretched on the earth, and that of another standing by him and holding in his hand a weapon stained with blood, the picture was actually a kind of *written* affidavit; for, however rude and primitive, it might represent some of the features and clothing of the assassin and his victim, and thus become an act of accusation against the murderer. Similar combi-

nations, more or less ingeniously contrived, constitute what is called *picture-writing*.

It is not probable that this art was brought to any degree of perfection by one man or nation, or even by one generation; but was gradually improved and extended by the successive hands of individuals, in the societies through which it passed. It seems to be the uniform voice of nature speaking to the first rude conceptions of mankind, as traces of it have been found among all nations at the infancy of society; and even at the present day all barbarous tribes, like the Indians of this continent, still strive to perpetuate their simple traditions by pictures.^[3] But these records are necessarily very inexact and incomplete, for painting can not transmit the fugitive sounds that escape from the lips of man, nor the secret thoughts which determine his actions; it can only retrace material objects, such as fall under the perception of sight, but is entirely inefficient to express abstract ideas and those with which the other senses have enriched the human intellect.

It was the simplification of picture-writing which led to a more regular system, and formed the second step in the art of writing.

A little reflection will discover that men, in their uncultivated state, had neither leisure, inclination, nor inducement to cultivate the powers of the mind to a degree sufficient for the invention of a regular form of visible language; but when a people arrived at such a state of civilization as required them to represent the conceptions of the mind which had no corporeal forms, necessity, the mother of invention, would occasion further exertions of the human faculties, and would urge such a people to find out a more expeditious manner of transacting their business, and of recording their events, than by picture-writing; for the impossibility of conveying a variety of intellectual and metaphysical ideas by pictures would naturally occur, and therefore the necessity of seeking out some other means that would be more comprehensive would present itself.

In picture-writing each figure meant specifically what it represented. Thus, the figure of the *sun* expressed or denoted that orb only; a *lion* or a *dog*, simply the animals thus depicted; but when men acquired more knowledge and attempted to describe qualities, as well as visible objects, these delineations were more figuratively explained; then the figure of the *sun*, besides its original meaning, denoted *glory* and *genial warmth*; that of the *lion*, *courage*; and that of the *dog*, *fi-*

delity. A still further improvement in civilization occasioned these delineations to become extremely numerous, every new object requiring a new picture. This induced the delineator to abridge the figures of most frequent recurrence, retaining so much of each figure as would express its species. At length, in order to avoid all unnecessary details, and at the same time to give the picture a more definite expression, they agreed in certain countries upon a given number of figures which stood as general terms to signify the main qualities of the objects thus represented. A more extensive application of this method suggested the addition of some arbitrary figures or symbols, which, by means of a supposed analogy, were to represent invisible objects or ideas; and this by a natural transition led to the adaptation of other figures or characters which represented sounds. This kind of writing, called *hieroglyphical*, is of the highest antiquity, and, diversely modified, has been found in all its different stages among many nations which originally had no communication with each other. The Egyptians, however, carried the art to its greatest extent; and this is one reason why they have been generally considered as the inventors of it, every species of hieroglyphics being recorded in their history.

The Egyptian hieroglyphics consist of three different species of characters: 1. *Hieroglyphics*, properly so called, in which the object is represented by a picture either entire or in abridged form. 2. *Symbolical*, in which an idea is expressed by some visible object which represents it—as adoration by a censer containing incense. 3. *Phonetic* characters, in which the sign represents not a visible object nor idea, but a sound. They read indifferently from right to left, left to right, and from top to bottom. The direction of the lines is indicated by the direction of the heads of the persons or animals represented, and is generally determined by the right or left hand side of the walls of the monuments. On obelisks the lines are read perpendicularly from the top downward. The emblems used generally resemble the forms of human beings, animals, objects of nature, mechanical instruments, etc., the properties and qualities of which, either real or conventional, suggested to the mind such ideas as usage had assigned to them. Thus a *viper* expressed ingratitude; a *crocodile*, wickedness; a *fly*, imprudence; an *ant*, wisdom; a *hawk*, power and victory; a *bee*, obedience of the people toward the sovereign; an *eye*, exact observance of justice; *an eye and scepter*, a king; *an eye in the clouds*, God's omniscience, etc.;

and, according to established rules, these figures were able to express a series of abstract ideas, which could be read by the initiated with a certain degree of accuracy, and for which mere picture-writing was altogether inefficient.

Previous to the year 1802, nothing had been done toward deciphering the meaning of hieroglyphics. The key of these mysteries was furnished by the celebrated Rosetta stone, now in the British Museum, which was discovered in 1799 by a French officer of engineers, between Rosetta and the sea, not far from the mouth of the Nile. It is a stone of black basalt, three feet in length and two feet five inches in breadth. It contains three inscriptions, one in the Greek language and characters, and the other two in dialects of the Egyptian language. Of the latter, one is in enchorial characters, the other in hieroglyphics. These inscriptions are a Ptolemaic edict, chiseled at Memphis, in honor of Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 196. The concluding sentence of this edict, which furnished the key to all the discoveries of the Egyptian antiquaries, is in the following words: "That this decree should be engraved on a tablet of hard stone in hieroglyphical, enchorial, and Greek characters, and be set up in the first, second and third-rate temples before the statue of the ever-living king." These words led to the natural inference that the inscription was the same in the three characters, and that the discovery of the *proper names* in each would give a clew to the construction of the whole. This mode was successful, and thanks to the incessant labors of Young, both Champollions, Rosellini, Lepsius, Wilkinson, and several others who have continued their learned investigations, hieroglyphics are now almost as perfectly readable as among the ancient Egyptians. The documents we possess of this kind of writing chiefly consist of manuscripts on papyrus and inscriptions on public monuments; they generally relate to historical events and funeral ceremonies. The earliest monuments extant are the pyramids and tombs of the third and fourth Memphite dynasties. They are purely *hieroglyphic*. About the twelfth dynasty, a period long antecedent to the time of Abraham, the transition took place from hieroglyphical into a more current form, termed the *hieratic* or *sacerdotal*, chiefly used in papyri. Besides these two there arose a third kind of writing, known as the *enchorial* or *demotic*, from being the popular mode of writing. It was alphabetic, and came into use about the time of Psammetichus, about 700 B.C. From this time it was in common

use until suppressed by a Roman imperial edict, and replaced by the Coptic alphabet of twenty-five Greek letters and seven Egyptian additions.

A kind of writing, similar to old Egyptian, was found among the ancient Mexicans at the time of their discovery by the Spaniards. They not only recorded historical events and genealogies by descriptive paintings, but they were also possessed of symbolical hieroglyphics, expressing by arbitrary signs such ideas as water, land, air, wind, light, darkness, speech, motion, etc. They had also symbols to express numbers and the different days and months of the solar year, to show the date of an event, if it had happened by day or by night, etc. This kind of writing was brought by them to a remarkable degree of perfection, and was regularly taught in schools by their elders. The ruined cities of Yucatan and other parts of Central America exhibit groups of hieroglyphics to all appearance of a still more refined and artificial character than those of the Mexicans. The Peruvians had a kind of hieroglyphic writing somewhat similar to that of the Mexicans, but roughly executed and much less perfect. For chronological purposes they made use of registers called *quipus*, which consisted of sets of strings tied with knots of various sizes and colors, and which, in a more simple form, were used by almost all American nations for the common purpose of counting. This sort of mnemotechnical instrument seems to be of a natural suggestion to man; it still exists in the *wampum belts* of the Indians, it corresponds to the *abacus* of the Romans, and traces of it are found in the monuments of the Egyptians and in the written language of the Chinese.

Chinese writing, which is now *symbolic*, was originally also *imitative*. The characters which replaced the primitive pictures were hieroglyphics similar to those of the Mexicans and Egyptians. Rude delineations of visible objects, the first symbols used, were soon reduced to an imperfect outline, and, in course of time, so little of the original figure was left, that nothing but a powerful association can recall it to the mind when the symbol is presented to the eye. This kind of writing, a complete development of the hieroglyphical principle, consists of two hundred and fourteen radical characters, and about forty thousand others, the meaning of which is generally agreed upon; to which must be added an infinite number of other signs, which is increased by a new one for every new idea. This makes them amount to about eighty

thousand, though he who is master of twelve or fifteen thousand is considered a very learned man. The Chinese doctors, in order to facilitate the reading of their language, have compiled lexicons and vocabularies provided with keys to assist consultation. These keys are the two hundred and fourteen radicals referred to, and contain the general outlines of characters used in each class of ideas represented. Thus, for instance, everything that relates to heaven, earth, mountain, man, horse, cattle, etc., is to be looked for under the character of *heaven*, *earth*, *mountain*, *man*, *horse*, *cattle*, etc.; but, although a great deal of skill has been displayed in the arrangement, a perfect and complete knowledge of them seems to be almost impossible. The Chinese books begin from the right hand; the characters are placed in perpendicular columns, and are read downward, beginning from the right hand side of the paper. This kind of writing is sometimes termed *ideographical*, from its representing ideas independently of sound, as the digit 8, for instance, which in English is called *eight*, in French *huit*, in Italian *otto*, etc.

The resemblances traceable between what little of purely figurative characters is still discernible in the earliest monuments of China, Egypt, and America, have given rise to speculations as to the community of origin or possible intercourse between these radically distinct nations at that primordial epoch; but these resemblances, few in reality, seem rather to result from the fact that similar causes, operating upon similar elements, naturally produce similar effects; that is, in Egypt, China, or America, when man wished to write “sun,” he drew an orb; when “moon,” a crescent, and so on. The picture was necessarily the same in all countries; hence the resemblance of the hieroglyphics derived from it.

It was certainly a great improvement in the art of writing when it passed from pictures into hieroglyphics; still their practical application remained but limited; for, as most of the symbols used were arbitrary, and generally turning on the least obvious, or even perhaps on imaginary properties of the animals or things represented, either to form or construe them required no small degree of learning and ingenuity. Even then, as the allusions drawn from them were forced and ambiguous, their meaning remained always indistinct, and subject to various interpretations. Hieroglyphics, however, contained in germ another kind of writing, the invention of which was to exercise a more

extensive and important influence on the improvement of the human race than any other.

It seems obvious that, while the picture or hieroglyphic presented itself to the sight, the writer's idea was confined to the figure or object itself; but when the picture was contracted into a mark, the sound annexed to the thing signified by such mark would become familiar, and, after the invention of arbitrary signs for abstract ideas, would naturally lead to the adaptation of other emblems to denote sounds. When the use of the latter had led in its turn to a more careful examination of the human voice, and the writer reflected how small a number of sounds he made use of in speech to express all his ideas, it would occur that a much fewer number of *marks* than he had been accustomed to use would be sufficient for the notation of all the *sounds* which he could articulate. These considerations would induce him to reflect on the nature and power of *sounds*; and it would occur that sounds being the matter of audible language, marks for them must be the elements of words: consequently, that by contriving as many symbols as there are articulate sounds in a language, they might be so combined as to represent every word of the vocabulary.

The first step in this new progress was the invention of a series of *syllables*, such as are still in use in Ethiopia and certain parts of India. By means of a particular sign for every syllable, the characters used in writing were thus reduced to a number much less than that of words, but still sufficiently numerous to make the art of reading and writing exceedingly complicated. At last some lofty genius arose, who, analyzing speech in its most simple elements, found it to consist of a small number of *elementary sounds*, modified by certain *articulations*, also limited in number, both of which he indicated by signs or *letters*, the whole forming an *alphabet* of *vowels* and *consonants*, by means of which he was enabled to convey, by corresponding characters, the various inflections of the human voice, and to put in writing all the different words of which a language is composed. Being thus reduced to such simplicity as to be placed within the reach of a child's intelligence, the art of writing made rapid progress, and was gradually brought to that perfection in which we find it practiced among all civilized nations of the earth.

The alphabet current in Europe and Western Asia may, with very few exceptions, be traced to a common source, namely, what is called

the ancient Phœnician. Whether the Phœnicians, in their incessant intercourse with Egypt, obtained from her civilized inhabitants their first knowledge of the possibility of writing with *phonetic* characters alone, without the habitual intermixture of figurative and symbolical signs, or that they were indebted for it to the Assyrians, the well-known parents of art and civilization in the East, has not yet been determined. The fact, however, that inscriptions, closely analogous in their character with the Phœnician, have been found in the ruins of Babylon, gives great weight to the latter opinion. Several Roman authors attribute the invention to the Phœnicians;^[4] but, however this may be, and whether they adopted the alphabet from their neighbors, or perhaps improved on what they had learned from them, it is unanimously agreed that they were the medium through which alphabetical writing was communicated to the European nations. The legendary account of the Cadmæan introduction of the twelve or sixteen primitive letters of the Greeks from Phœnicia is also confirmed by the name *KaDeM*, which simply means *East*; the most ancient Greek alphabet bears, moreover, the closest analogy in its forms to that of the ancient Phœnicians, while the Latin, Etruscan, Celtiberian, and other European characters, are only modifications of the same system.

The art of phonetic writing has sprung up so gradually, and the written annals of ancient nations are so imperfect or fabulous, that, if it is extremely difficult to decide as to the people among whom it originated, it is much more so to form any conjecture as to the probable epoch of its invention. The profane authors generally attribute the discovery of letters to the gods, or to some divine man. Plato delivers his sentiments very plainly upon this subject,^[5] and Cicero, who perfectly agrees with him,^[6] states that it was Hermes, or the fifth Mercury, whom the Egyptians called *Thoth*, who first communicated letters to that people.^[7] Diodorus Siculus mentions Mercury as the inventor of the alphabet^[8] and the Hindoos affirm that written characters were communicated to their ancestors by the Supreme Being, whom they call Brahma. These authorities have evidently no weight with us, for we know that it was customary among the ancients, as Plato tells us himself, “when they could not unravel a difficulty, to bring down a god, as in a machine, to cut the knot.”^[9] Yet this very custom of referring all valuable discoveries and inventions of which the origin and memory were lost, such as *wheat*, *wine*, *writing*, *astron-*

omy, civil society, etc., to the gods, whose attributes were as ancient as tradition itself, seems to point to the highest antiquity, and in the mean time to the improbability of our ever discovering even as much as an approximating date for the epoch of the invention.

The remoteness of the antiquity of Grecian writings, in which we are particularly interested, and which by some has been placed as far back as the fifteenth century B.C., is also entirely traditional, and inductively drawn through classical authority, as no inscriptions in that character are extant older than the sixth century before our era, and their primitive form seems not to indicate a long previous use or acquaintance with a purely phonetic alphabet.^[10] Homer's works are said to be of a more ancient date; but Josephus maintains that Homer did not leave his books in *writing*, but that they were learned by heart, and afterward put together; and thus he accounts for many inconsistencies in the "Iliad."^[11] It is observable that in all the works under Homer's name, no mention occurs of the art of phonetic writing.^[12] Some modern critics have even gone so far as to doubt his individuality, and suppose the poems attributed to him to have been productions of all Greece, collected and arranged, at a time when the meaning of symbolical writing began to be lost, by Pisistratus (deceased about 528 B.C.); and hence that all the cities, recognizing their national contributions, and apprised that the whole was by one author, should each of them claim the honor of his birth.^[13] Although this opinion is far from being generally admitted, yet it invalidates the argument for placing the introduction of letters in Greece before 900 B.C., the epoch at which Homer is said to have written, and certainly opposes all ground for its being carried back to the fifteenth century, the era ascribed to the Cadmean immigration into Greece, personified in the cognomen *KaDeM*, that is, "eastern," of a mythological individual who "sowed dragon's teeth, and reaped armed soldiers." Tradition also falters in the ascription to Cadmus of *twelve* or *sixteen* letters, to which an unknown Palamedes added *four*, and a later Simonides *four more*, to complete the *twenty-four* letters of the Greek alphabet; whereas Pliny, quoting Aristotle,^[14] states that the primitive *Kadmean*, that is, *Oriental*, alphabet had eighteen letters, which fact is found in the oldest Grecian inscriptions. The earliest examples of Grecian writing read in horizontal lines alternately from left to right and right to left, and have the form of the characters reversed in every

succeeding line. This mode of connecting the lines, termed *Boustrophedon*, from its imitating the furrows of a field plowed by oxen, was certainly the most natural; experience, however, having taught it to be easier to read every line in the same direction, that of the left to the right was generally adopted, and followed by all nations who derived their alphabet from the Greek. The Hebrews and Arabians have adopted the reverse order.

The names of the letters of some alphabets are significant; a circumstance which has given rise to the supposition that their form was originally derived from characters which, like the Chinese, were representative of things. The phonetic signs of the Egyptians were images of physical and material objects, each of which stood for the initial of the word which expressed the object represented. So a lion, *Labo*, stood for the articulation L; a mouth, *Ru*, for R; a hand, *Tot*, for T, etc. In Hebrew, *Aleph* (א) signifies ox; *Beth* (ב), a booth; *Gimel* (ג), a camel, etc.; and some pretend to see in these characters the rude outlines of the head and horns of an ox, of a tent or hut, and of the head and neck of a camel. In the Icelandic, *Fie* (F) is a flock; *Ur* (U), a torrent; *Duss* (D), mountain spirits, etc. The Irish alphabet is termed *Wood*, and its letters are each denominated by the name of a shrub or tree. Thus, *Ailm* (A) is an elm; *Beth* (B), a birch; *Col* (C), a hazel, and so of the others. Such names would seem at first sight to connect these alphabets also with picture-writing, but the association of the letters with the initial articulations of certain words had probably no other design than to fix the power of the letter more firmly in the memory, in the same way as we teach our children, both by the eye and by the ear, to say, B, bull; C, cat; D, dog; F, fox; G, goat, etc.

Setting aside some doubtful pretensions, it does not appear that any of the countries of Europe, exclusive of Greece and Italy, possessed a national alphabet previous to their conversion to Christianity. The spirit of proselytism was very favorable to the extension of letters; for, as the religious appeal was made to books that were written in a foreign tongue, it became in general necessary that the bishops and monks should be acquainted with other languages than their own. Some of them, in translating the Gospel, framed special and appropriate alphabets—as Ulphilas, among the Goths, in the fourth century, and Cyrillus, among the Slavonians, in the ninth—in the same manner as, at the present day, missionaries fabricate new alphabets for bar-

barous and distant tribes. The merit of these contrivances, however, has been generally overrated, for they have seldom been an improvement, and certainly required no extraordinary powers on the part of the contrivers. We have lately witnessed on this continent a far more remarkable instance of human intellect in the invention of an original alphabet by a Cherokee chief. This individual, called by his countrymen *See-Quah-Nah*, having received some vague intimation that the white men communicated their ideas by means of visible symbols, resolved to construct a system of writing applicable to his own language. At first he attempted, like the Chinese, to form an appropriate symbol for every separate word; but finding, as he proceeded, the labor and difficulty of such a task, he determined to try to express *sounds* instead of *ideas*, and formed an alphabet of two hundred characters, which he gradually reduced to eighty. He had sufficient influence to persuade his tribe to study and adopt the new system; and in process of time a typographical apparatus was procured, by means of which a Cherokee journal and other small publications were made available to the nation. Few more signal triumphs of human sagacity over difficulties are upon record; but we must remember that the process was facilitated, in some degree, by the knowledge that such a system was in actual operation elsewhere, and probably by an idea more or less distinct of the manner in which it might be done. It is probably in the same way that the Japanese have been able to make a similar contrivance. Among the various methods of writing current in their country, one called *Kata Kana* is a regular syllabarium of forty-seven Chinese characters, to which specific sounds are attached in the latter language. Had it ever entered into the minds of the Egyptians to simplify their complex and elaborate system, they could easily have constructed an alphabet closely analogous to the latter by selecting single characters from their multitude of phonetic hieroglyphics, or from the hieratic or enchorial abbreviations of them. This, in fact, was done to a certain extent when they adopted alphabetic writing after their conversion to Christianity. The characters which they found it necessary to add to the Greek alphabet to express articulations peculiar to their own language, are evidently taken, with very slight modifications, from their enchorial system of writing. Their not taking some similar step many centuries sooner, must be attributed to national prejudice, or perhaps to the unwillingness felt by those who held the key of knowledge to

place it in the hands of the people; although it may have also arisen from their perfect confidence in the superiority of the current system of hieroglyphics.

In fact, the symbolical method of writing seems at the outset to have the advantage over the alphabetical by establishing a direct relation between objects and ideas. This advantage we perceive by observing the slow progress of a child in spelling, and his great psychological labor to learn to read understandingly without the assistance of pictures; and will be still better felt by every one who, in studying a foreign language, has had occasion to experience how difficult it is to perceive at first the triple correlation between *sounds*, *signs*, and *ideas*. For certain purposes, such as arithmetic, symbols have unquestionably the advantage, for, independently of the decimal system of grouping them, the idea of quantity is much more readily and clearly conveyed to the mind if represented in figures than if written in words. It has even been surmised, and it is not impossible, that this direct relation between objects and ideas was favorable to the early development of civilization among the Chinese. But, from the moment this civilization became more complex, and the multiplicity of ideas increased beyond measure the number of symbols to express them, then the contrary effect was produced, and what was first a facility has finally proved to be an obstacle. In fact, while their spoken dialects are left to tradition alone, their written language has become a most complicated study, more conducive to patience than to progress; and there is no doubt that the absence of a phonetic alphabet stands foremost among the reasons which account for the stagnancy of Chinese civilization.

Nothing but the phonetic alphabet could have bestowed upon the world the immense benefit which it has derived from the art of writing. While serving as a torch to guide the mind in its most abstract contemplations, its most minute researches, it has become the means of embodying and transmitting the same with an almost miraculous precision by representing the very sound of the words in which the ideas are conveyed. If, at first, there exists some difficulty in perceiving the triple relation of sounds, signs, and ideas, this difficulty soon vanishes to make room for the clearest understanding; for no sooner are we able to read with fluency, than the words assume a familiar physiognomy which renders them real hieroglyphics, the features of

which, however complex or delicate, are so plainly discernible as to leave a mistake almost impossible. Being founded upon the sound by which the object is named, these features, or *letters*, have moreover the advantage of appealing to the ear as well as to the eye, thus awakening other sensations; which, increasing our faculty of perception, enable us to comprehend the most abstract ideas expressed in writing as clearly and perfectly as we conceive the form and color of material objects from pictures.

With the invention of alphabetic writing commences a new era in the history of language, from the control it exercised in the formation of new words and phrases, and the development of language in general. Until then, sounds that vibrated in the air were heard and repeated without precision, and language changed from generation to generation, for tradition alone could not transmit it without alteration. Thus every tribe, every family, may have spoken a different dialect, and even each individual have had his own manner of pronouncing, which in course of time must have necessarily affected and altered the words. Rules existed nowhere, and the caprice of a few was enough to throw a growing idiom into utter confusion. Under such circumstances no progress of language was possible, for even innovation wants a principle to start from, and continual changes never lead to improvement. It was only after the invention of signs, by which the sound of words could be preserved, that languages were no longer exposed to incessant losses and alterations. Firmly fixed by writing, old words did not vanish so soon from memory, new terms were no more in danger of dying at their birth, and language, enriched by time and improved by use, could henceforth aspire to immortality, at least as far as such is permitted to anything which is the work of man.

It is now proper to inquire what materials have been used for writing upon in different ages and countries. The most ancient remains of writing which have been transmitted to us are upon hard substances, such as *stones* and *metals*, which were used for edicts and matters of public notoriety. The Decalogue was written on two tables of stone. The penal and civil laws among the Greeks were engraved on tables of brass called *Cyrbes*. Among the Romans, the laws of the twelve tables were equally on brass. The Egyptian hieroglyphics, the Parian chronicle, with the numerous public and private inscriptions, Greek, Roman, and Indian, still extant, are evidences how extensively this method

of keeping records intended for permanency was employed by the ancients; and it is to their choice of such durable materials that we are indebted for the preservation of much valuable information.^[15] This custom of engraving public transactions on stones and metals was practiced from the earliest times till after the decline of the Roman empire, and is now confined to tombstones, to monuments erected to celebrated personages, and to medals.

Wood was also used for writing upon in different countries. The Chinese, before the invention of paper, wrote or engraved with an iron tool upon their boards, or on bamboo. Several ancient authors inform us that the laws of Solon were inscribed on tables of wood.^[16] Table-books were also known to the Jews.^[17] Among the Romans they were of most common use: the wood was cut into thin slices and neatly planed and polished; the writing was at first upon the bare wood, with an iron instrument called a style; in later times these tablets were usually waxed over and written upon with that instrument; this writing was easily effaced, and by smoothing the wax new matter might be substituted in the place of what had been written before. They were used as memoranda, and more especially for correcting extemporary compositions^[18] before committing them to writing in books of papyrus, leaves, or skins. Table-books written upon with styles were only laid aside in the fourteenth century, when they were superseded by ivory tablets, written upon with lead-pencils.

It is evident that none of the above methods were well adapted to voluminous writings, and, consequently, substances of a more portable and tractable nature were introduced at a very early period. The *skins* of beasts were used for writing upon in the most early ages. Diodorus Siculus says that the ancient Persians wrote their records on skins,^[19] and Herodotus affirms that the skins of sheep and goats were used for writing upon in the earliest times by the Ionians. The Mexicans also used skins for their paintings. Parchment, which was once extensively used for books and documents of all kinds, is now entirely confined to testimonials and diplomas.

The *bark of trees* has also been used for writing upon in every part of the globe, and it still serves for this purpose in several parts of Asia. Some Mexican hieroglyphics are painted on bark; and it is observable that the word *liber* was used by the Romans as well for the bark of a tree as for a book.

Leaves have also served the same purpose. The Sibyls' leaves referred to by Virgil^[20] prove that writing on leaves was once familiar to the Romans. Diodorus Siculus relates that the judges of Syracuse were anciently accustomed to write the names of those whom they sent into banishment upon the leaves of olive-trees.^[21] The practice of writing upon leaves of palm-trees is still very prevalent in different parts of the East. But the most common article manufactured by the ancients to write upon was the *papyrus*. The plant of which it was made grows in Egypt, and abounds in marshy places where the Nile overflows and stagnates. It is a triangular reed, from three to four feet high, and about a foot and a half in circumference at the thickest part. After taking off the rind the film was cut into thin pellicles, which were laid, two or more, over each other transversely, and glued together either with the glutinous water of the Nile or with fine paste made of wheat-flour. After being pressed and dried, they were made smooth with a heavy roller, or rubbed over with a solid glass hemisphere. These operations constituted the Egyptian papyrus as far as the art of making it has been discovered.^[22] Being coveted by many other nations, it became a principal article of commerce with the Egyptians. In the early ages all diplomatic instruments were written upon this paper in preference to everything else, on account of its beauty and size. In the seventh century the papyrus was superseded by parchment, and after the eighth it is rarely to be seen; it was, however, used in Italy for epistolary writing in the time of Charlemagne, and by the popes even in the eleventh century; in the twelfth it was not yet entirely disused.

Paper is said to have been invented in China about fifty years after the birth of Christ,^[23] but many contend that it is of much earlier antiquity among that people. Paper made of cotton was an Eastern invention, and was probably known as early as the ninth century;^[24] it, however, only came into general use during the twelfth century of the Christian era. Paper made of rags was first introduced in the course of the thirteenth century. Its invention has been ascribed to the Chinese, though others have asserted that the Saracens of Spain first brought it from the East into that country, whence it was dispersed over the rest of Europe. For ordinary purposes every other material has been gradually superseded by paper, which, though less durable than vellum or parchment, is less costly and more commodious.

It is obvious that when men wrote, or rather engraved, on hard substances, instruments of metal were necessary, such as the chisel and the style. The Roman stylus was originally made of iron, but afterward of silver, brass, bone, or ivory. It was made sharp at one end to write with, and blunt at the other to efface and correct what was not approved.^[25] A similar instrument is still used on the coast of Malabar to write on bark. The ancient name for pen (*calamus*) shows that *reeds* were originally employed for writing on the softer materials; those reeds were furnished in great quantity by Egypt,^[26] and are still used for the same purpose by all the Eastern nations. *Quills* of geese, swans, peacocks, crows, etc., have been used in western Europe since the seventh century.^[27] *Metallic pens* are of but recent introduction, and, although less adapted than quill-pens for the finer descriptions of writing, have almost entirely superseded the latter. The Chinese and some other Eastern nations, who form their characters with broad strokes, generally employ a *hair-pencil* with Indian ink.

Inks of different colors and degrees of consistence were known at a very early period; and there can be no better proof of their excellent quality than the fact that manuscripts known to be from one thousand to thirteen hundred years old are still perfectly legible.^[28] Some books were written in characters of gold and silver; but these were of rare occurrence, on account of the expense of preparing them, and were chiefly confined to copies of the Scriptures intended for the use of exalted personages.^[29]

Such were the principal improvements made in the materials and methods of writing from its first invention to within four hundred years. Until then all existing science was contained in copied manuscripts. It would be superfluous to dwell on the inefficiency of this method as a means of propagating truth and diffusing knowledge, as it is obvious that, independent of the inevitable inaccuracies attending the tedious process of copying, the price of books was such as to place them only within the reach of the most wealthy. Under such circumstances it seems astonishing that no mechanical means of copying was invented, when the time is hardly known that printing, in some shape or other, did not in fact exist.

It has not been pretended that the art of printing was practiced by the Romans, and yet the names they stamped on their earthen vessels were in effect nothing but printing, and the letters on the matrices or

stamps used for making these impressions were necessarily reversed, like those of our printing-types.^[30] The ruins of Babylon and Nineveh offer other instances of primitive printing in their tiles or bricks,^[31] some of which appear to have been impressed by means of engraved cylinders. The art of impressing figures and legends upon coins is nothing more than printing on metals. Printing from wooden blocks is generally allowed to have been practiced by the Chinese ever since the year 927,^[32] and was probably adopted by them from the Indian mode of stamping cottons. Toward the end of the twelfth century we find in Europe the same practice of taking impressions from engraved blocks of wood, sometimes for playing-cards, which came into use not long before that time, and sometimes for rude cuts of saints. The latter were frequently accompanied by a few lines of explanatory letters cut in the block. Gradually entire pages were engraved and impressed in this manner, and thus began what are called *block-books*, printed by fixed characters, but never exceeding a very few leaves. These blocks seem to have been all executed in Holland.

The similarity of the process has given rise to the supposition that the art of printing might have been introduced into Europe by some European who had traveled into China, and had seen some of their printing-tablets, for it is known that several Europeans had been overland into China before that time; and what strengthens this supposition in some degree is that the Europeans first printed on one side of the paper only, in the same manner as the Chinese. But, however this may be, the art remained stationary in China, whereas it made great progress in Europe.

The Chinese blocks were cut upon ebony and other hard wood, but the European blocks were carved upon beech, pear-tree, and other soft woods, which soon failed, and the letters frequently broke. This put the printers upon the method of repairing the block, by carving new letters and gluing them in, which necessity seems to have suggested the hint of movable types. The great and obvious advantage of this process was, that by separating the types they would serve for any other work, whereas the blocks of wood served only for one work; and though this was a very fortunate discovery, yet it derived its origin rather from the imperfection of the European woods for printing-blocks, than from any great ingenuity of those who first used them. In short, necessity, the mother of all arts, introduced *movable types*. It

has been a matter of contest who first practiced the art of printing on this principle. Laurens Koster, of Haarlem, is said to have substituted movable for fixed letters as early as 1430; and some have believed that a book called "Speculum Humanæ Salvationis," of very rude wooden characters, proceeded from the Haarlem press before any other that is generally recognized. Koster's priority, however, is disputed by those who deem Gutenberg, a native of Mentz, but settled at Strasburg, the real inventor of the art, and some have asserted that he actually printed a few fugitive pieces from movable wooden characters before 1450; but of these there seems to be no evidence.

All great inventions appear to have sprung up at various epochs, and to have been brought into use in several different places at about the same period; and so there is no fair reason to dispute that Gutenberg might also have struck out an idea that surely did not require extraordinary skill, and which left the most important difficulties to be surmounted, as they undeniably were, by himself and his coadjutors. Thus, while the priority of the invention remains a matter of dispute, it is agreed by all that about 1450, Gutenberg, having gone to Mentz, entered into partnership with Faust, a rich merchant of that city, for the purpose of carrying the invention into effect. It was there that, in the year 1452, Peter Schöffer, their assistant in the work, brought the art to perfection by devising the present mode of casting types; namely, the punches of engraved steel, by which the matrices or molds are struck, and without which, independent of the economy of labor, there could be no uniformity of shape. According to this, Schöffer must be reckoned the inventor of the art of printing in the modern sense; for movable wooden letters, though small books may possibly have been printed by means of them, are so inconvenient, and letters of cut metal so expensive, that few great works were likely to have passed through the press till cast types were employed.

It is a remarkable fact in the art of printing that one of the later improvements has been the return very near to its original simplicity. After the invention of single letters, which might be combined into pages, and after being printed from might be distributed and rearranged for another work, a process has been adopted which approaches more nearly to the old plan of printing from page-blocks, either by fusing the types composing a page into a solid mass, or, as in the modern art of *stereotyping*, by taking a mold in plaster from the

page or *form* of movable types, and using it as the matrix in which to make a solid cast or plate of type-metal. The face of such a cast is a *fac-simile* of the types from which the mold is taken, and may be printed from in the same manner as the original form or page. For scientific works, such as mathematical tables, etc., this mode of copying has a great advantage, for, as individual alterations may be made in the plates, they may be corrected in every edition, and by the gradual extirpation of error at last become perfect. In works of great and constant demand the process of stereotyping has been, moreover, one of the most important means by which the production of cheap editions has been facilitated in late years, since it enables the publisher to keep up the supply of copies according to the demand, without the unnecessary outlay of capital either for very large editions or for their re-composition in type.

The modern improvements in machinery have greatly contributed to bring the art of typography to its present perfection. For the last half century books have multiplied innumerable, and forced knowledge and information into the density of the forest, and even beyond the confines of society. A press is now among the first implements of a new colony. Steam and electricity, the two great powers of the age to conquer time and distance, have both been applied to the art of printing, with the utmost success. While the printing telegraph literally writes down, at any distance and in ordinary characters, intelligence nearly as soon as received, some of the newspaper presses actually complete more work in one hour than would require one thousand of the most dexterous copyists during a whole year. No country has been more benefited by the invention than America, where, thanks to the enlightened and liberal spirit of the nation in educating the masses, to read, to learn, to know, have become a mere question of time, neither the price nor the scarcity of books being any longer an obstacle.

Words

DISCOURSE includes four objects of consideration: *realities, thoughts, articulate speech, and written expression*. Realities are represented by thoughts, thoughts by articulate speech, and articulate speech is represented by written expression. *Language* is the expression of human thought; but *words*, which are the elements thereof, are the signs of ideas, which are themselves the elements of thought.

In considering the nature of words, we first distinguish between *the sign* and *the idea*: the one, material, which is appreciable by the senses—the other, immaterial, which is appreciable by the mind only; the one, the body—the other, the soul of the word. The sign, which may be audible or visible, as it is spoken or written, calls forth the idea, as the latter may suggest the former; but from the intimate association which exists between the idea and the thing represented, either of these may be considered as the signification of the word. Words, therefore, may be said to represent, primarily, our thoughts; and, secondarily, the external objects of our thoughts, whether our consciousness of those be the result of perception or conception.

The use of one common language determines the nationality of a people, and binds them in a fraternal bond; the people, in their turn, give the language the impress of their ideas and feelings, of their disposition and genius. Hence it is that a language always represents the ideological character of the nation that speaks or spoke it, and becomes, as it were, the criterion by which we may judge of its degree of civilization. For the language of a people is the exponent of that people's feelings, and the usage by which that language is regulated is the aggregate of these feelings and thoughts.

The intellectual peculiarities by which nations are distinguished from each other thus naturally account for the corresponding peculiarities we find in their idioms, both as regards the choice of words, and

the changes made in them to express varieties of sense, as well as regards the way in which they are arranged. These differences in forms of expression are often very considerable, even between two nations who speak kindred dialects and pursue the same paths of civilization; but the number of these differences is beyond conception when the two nations speak languages which have not a common origin, or when they differ in their religious creeds, political institutions, social habits, industrial pursuits, and scientific attainments. Great as then may be their divergence, and the variety of detail we may discover on comparing them, we will always find the vocabulary and phraseology of each and every language to correspond to the various features of the different societies of whose civilization they are, or have been, the expression.

In treating of the origin of language, we remarked that articulate speech is a necessary consequence of man's constitution. He has received with the faculty of thought the corresponding faculty of speech—that is, the power of spontaneously forming words by imitation. However people may differ respecting the interpretation of the sacred writ in reference to the first language, certain it is that man is endowed with, and freely uses, the power of making and extending speech in proportion to his acquisitions, to his social wants, and to the development of his intellect. Whatever, therefore, may have been the language of our first parents, adapted, as it undoubtedly was, to the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed, it must necessarily have been limited to the representation of the few objects with which they were surrounded; a more extensive vocabulary could only have embarrassed and confused them. It must have been poor indeed, destitute as it was of all the metaphysical and technical terminology which arises from the infinite relations of society, the progress of arts and sciences, and all the refinements of civilization. In the absence, also, of a written form, which might have given it permanence, its original words must soon have been lost, or at least much altered and corrupted. Hence, in the infancy of society, and in different localities, men were often reduced to the necessity of forming new signs of ideas, which constituted the elements of various primitive languages. It must not be supposed, however, that with the progress of civilization new terms were invented for every new object that came under observation. This may sometimes have been the case, but more often it was found con-

venient to use a word already existing which presented some analogy with new conceptions, sensations, or impressions. It is thus that all articulate languages have gradually been formed. The various words which constitute their wealth have been introduced but very slowly; and the different parts of speech have undoubtedly been the result of successive improvements consequent on mental advancement.

Whatever may have been the first words spoken, there is every reason to suppose that they were, for the most part, monosyllabic *substantives*—names of things within the reach of man's perceptive powers, and which, from the varied sensations arising therefrom, called forth his mental activity and imitative faculties. In conformity with these dictates of nature, the first use which man made of the gift of speech—that is, the power of making articulate signs for his ideas—was probably to name individual animals, as each species came within his notice, by words either analogous to their cries,^[33] or indicative of their peculiar nature, so far as this could be effected by articulate sounds. He then, and by analogy, could give to other objects of sense which engaged his attention names that characterized them by their most striking properties.

Concrete substantives, which form the basis of language, preceded those which are abstract;^[34] for as the union of the properties and substratum precedes their resolution, it is natural to suppose that the concrete notions of things existed before the abstract conception was formed by comparison and analysis. It may further be presumed that substantives, significant at first of particular objects, were soon after applied indifferently to other things of the same kind; hence general nouns arose, from which a better acquaintance with the nature of things, and a correct perception of their resemblances and differences, led to the distinction of individuals, species, and genera, and to the introduction of corresponding terms. This gradual introduction of generic terms is illustrated in some of the Oriental languages, which often show the utmost deficiency in words indicating genera, while abounding in terms denoting individual distinction.

After substantives had passed from the individual to the specific and generic sense, it became necessary to distinguish one object from another of the same kind, and to state the particular manner in which each affected the senses; this double consideration led men, by an act of abstraction, to notice, and then name, in connection with the

substantives, the peculiar qualities, properties, or other modes of being, which characterized one or a number of the things represented by those substantives. These terms of comparison, expressive of the attributes of things, constitute that class of words which are called *adjectives*. As substantives were introduced to discriminate between objects of different kinds, so adjectives served to discriminate between objects of the same kind.

These two species of words—substantives and adjectives—necessarily enter into the nomenclature of all languages, because, in every community, things and their properties are made the subject of discourse. These two species of words are indispensable for the expression of a judgment: the first signifies the subject, or the thing of which we think; the second, the attribute which we perceive in that thing, or which we affirm of it.

But it was not enough, in the expression of a judgment, to name the thing which is the subject of thought, and the property or quality attributed to it; a word was needed to specify clearly and distinctly the connection and the mode of relation between the subject and its attribute. This third conventional sign is the *verb*; it forms with the other two a proposition, or the expression of a complete judgment. It may be conjectured that the first verb served only to affirm the existence of the attribute in the subject, as expressed by the English term *to be*; but, by a natural tendency to expansion, it was made, in process of time, to denote, besides this affirmation, the attribute itself, as well as time, person, and number: such is the present condition of verbs in all modern idioms. It is thus that this part of speech, which in its origin was perhaps the most simple, has become the most complex, in consequence of the accessories of different kinds which have been successively added to its generic meaning; and although it was introduced in the infancy of articulate language, it is to be presumed that a very long interval of time must have elapsed before its moods, tenses, and persons were definitely fixed upon, as they exist in the most improved idioms.

Substantives, adjectives, and verbs, the primary and indispensable elements of simple sentences, were, in the course of time, found insufficient to follow the complex operations of the mind; they were, consequently, modified, abbreviated, or combined into other words which served as accessories in the expression of more complicated thoughts.

These secondary words, however, were not always used separately; the analysis of language sufficiently proves that in many instances they were made to coalesce with primary words, in order to modify their signification, and determine their grammatical functions.

Of the secondary words, *determinatives* must have been among the first which were introduced; because the progress of intellectual intercourse early required that the subject of thought be determined independently of the quality or property found therein, and that general terms be occasionally extended or restricted in their application. By means of determinatives men were enabled to designate particular individuals without having recourse to proper names—a system of representation which would have been impracticable from the multiplicity of terms required. Particular names would, in general, be useless, for the objects of our thoughts are not so much the individuals themselves, as the species to which they belong.

When once the imperative requirements of social communication were supplied, exactness, refinement, and intellectual gratification were aimed at. Languages, in advancing to perfection, naturally tend to satisfy the mind and follow the rapidity of thought. The adoption of *pronouns* was one of the results of this double tendency: by avoiding the vagueness of nouns and disagreeable repetitions, they give precision and vivacity to discourse. Pronouns are probably contractions of nouns, determinative terms used elliptically, or abbreviated forms of phrases, serving to designate individuals. Thus the words and phraseology significant of the most familiar ideas, from their every-day and universal use, and from the tendency to rapid speaking just adverted to, undergo successive contractions; like pebbles on the beach, they are worn away until they lose every corner and mark which would indicate their original form.

In proportion as man's vocabulary increased, so must have increased the desire of extending his investigations and the power of forming chains of ideas. Things which, at first, had been considered separately, were viewed in their various relations. Hence originated *prepositions*, which expressed, properly, the relative local aspects of things as they presented themselves to the senses, and, analogically, the relations of the abstract conceptions of the mind. Prepositions must have been introduced at an advanced state of language; for the

ideas of relation which they represent demand great powers of abstraction and generalization.

A further step in the psychological progress of man led him to discriminate between the various circumstances of time, place, quantity, and manner, which modified the actions, states, or attributes that were the subject of his thoughts. These circumstances, being themselves the particular relations which actions, states, or attributes bear to time, place, quantity, or manner, were, at first, expressed by phrases composed of words already existing—substantives and prepositions—but their frequent recurrence, and man's tendency to shorten discourse, that it may keep pace with the ideas, naturally caused these phrases to be gradually compressed into single words, which have been named *adverbs*.

The words which there is every reason to suppose were the last to appear in primitive languages were *conjunctions*; for all the other parts of speech must long have served for the expression of simple ideas, and phraseology must have assumed a certain regularity of form before the need was felt of words by which to express the connection of judgments, the relation and dependence between propositions. There can be no close reasoning, no logical unity of speech, without conjunctions; and it is noticeable that tribes which have advanced but little in civilization are generally very deficient in this important part of speech.

That there existed, for any length of time, only primary words, or that there elapsed a long interval before the secondary words were all in common use, is more than can be asserted; only we may venture to believe that they probably made their appearance in the order here mentioned. In the instinctive acts of infants can practically be traced the processes of intellect in the infancy of nations, for the child, in acquiring his vernacular tongue, follows exactly the same order as that which must have taken place in the gradual adoption of the spoken elements; substantives, adjectives, and verbs are the first words of his vocabulary. The deaf and dumb, circumstanced, in reference to language, nearly as men in primitive societies, are remarkable for neglecting, in their first written compositions, articles, pronouns, and conjunctions. Nature is universal and immutable in her laws; she guides individuals from infancy to manhood, as she does nations from barbarism to civilization.

Classification of Words

To classify words in a uniform and corresponding manner in all idioms, their import should be considered in reference to the functions they perform in the communication of thought and the expression of ideas. This classification, if properly defined, is necessarily the same for all languages and dialects, because the differences existing between words are analogous to those that exist between the ideas which they represent; and these are everywhere the same, owing to the invariable laws of the human mind to which they are subjected. Sometimes, it is true, we do find words, in more than one language, apparently the same, which differ in their meaning, while the identity of nature in others which signify the same is not always obvious; for the scanty of language, compared with the infinite number of ideas to be expressed, constantly obliges men to use one part of speech for another, and to attach different ideas to the same words, nay, even to combine several words to express but one idea. The diversity of circumstances in which these irregularities take place in different idioms is one of the chief causes of dissimilarity between them.

Still, none of these irregularities, sometimes found in words, affect in any way their proper classification, for since their nature and grammatical character depend on the office which they fill in discourse, and not on their external form, their import alone must be considered, exclusively of ellipsis or derivation. If ellipsis were taken into account, great uncertainty might prevail in classifying words, as it is often difficult to follow the changes and contractions which expressions have undergone in the course of time. Nor is derivation a sure criterion by which classes of words can be ascertained, because they are not always applied the same way in their derivative as in their primitive form; many words which in two languages have one common origin, or are derived one from the other, perform functions altogether different,

and awake in the mind completely distinct ideas. Words, therefore, as parts of the sentence, are distinguished by their use alone; any other distinctions which they may happen to have are accidents which vary in different languages, and at different times and places, without altering their grammatical character.

The words that form the vocabulary of any language may be divided into two main parts—one comprising all *notional* words, the other the words and signs that indicate *relation*. By notional words is meant those which express notions—that is, ideas of things, acts, properties, and qualities that are the objects of the understanding, such as are expressed by *verbs*, *nouns*, and *adjectives*. By words and signs of relation is meant such as merely express a relation between the different things, acts, and qualities which are the objects of the understanding. These signs of relation are either mere terminations—that is, final letters which modify the form of the notional word—or they are separate words expressive by themselves. For instance, in the English phrases, “the dog barks,” “my father’s horse,” “the falling house,” the *s*, *’s*, and *ing* are respectively terminations which indicate a relation between the things and acts in the several phrases. In the phrases, “he lives *in* the city,” “he left us *after* dinner,” *in* and *after* are relational words—that is, they connect the notions expressed by “his living” and “his leaving” respectively with the notions of “city” and “dinner.” Thus we may consider notional words as the matter of language, and relational words as giving to language its form—that is, its grammatical structure. It must be observed, however, that in many languages which possess few terminations a considerable part of the relations which subsist among words are indicated by the order in which these words are placed, which is true to some extent of all languages, modern languages especially, and particularly of French and English.

Utility and simplicity being the essence of all elements, none but single words, whether simple or compound, are entitled to be classed among the above-mentioned elements of discourse. Complex forms, consisting of separate words, which, from the unavoidable poverty of language, frequently supply the place of single terms, should be considered as phrases, not as pure parts of speech. All languages abound in such expressions, which, whether composed of two or more words, may be denominated *substantival phrases*, *adjectival phrases*, *verbal*

phrases, pronominal phrases, prepositional phrases, etc., as they stand for substantives, adjectives, verbs, pronouns, prepositions, etc. It is in this way that words of one language, which have not an equivalent in another, can always be rendered by phrases. The single words of a language can be enumerated, but its complex forms, to whatever class they belong, are beyond computation; they are multiplied indefinitely to suit the endless variety and combinations of ideas.

Substantives

THE SUBSTANTIVE, or NOUN, is the first term of the proposition, the representative of the subject respecting which judgment is expressed. Being the fundamental word of discourse, it imposes on all the others, as its subordinates, their form and place. Its function is to represent the idea of substance, by which word, *substance*, is grammatically meant any subject of thought, material or immaterial, or even a quality abstractedly considered. As the substance implies the collective elements or essential properties which constitute it, so the substantive expresses a collection of the simple perceptions and conceptions of those elements or properties. The word *gold*, for example, comprises in its signification all the simple notions of color, weight, brilliancy, compactness, fusibility, malleability, ductility, incorruptibility, etc., which constitute and characterize this metal. The idea conveyed by a substantive will be the more clear and correct as it suggests to the mind a greater number of the properties which form the essence of the thing signified. Hence it is that the knowledge of words is commensurate with the knowledge of things.

The collection of ideas comprised within the signification of a substantive constitutes its *comprehension*; this comprehension is the greater as a larger number of simple ideas contribute to the general idea represented by the substantive. The number of individuals to which a substantive applies forms its *extension*; this extension is the greater as its signification embraces a greater number of individuals. The comprehension and the extension of substantives expressive of genera, species, and individuals, stand always in inverse ratio to each other; for the number of individuals is the smaller as a greater number of attributes constitutes their signification. Thus, in the following series of general terms: *being*, *animal*, *quadruped*, *elephant*, every subsequent term comprehends in its signification all that is in the preced-

ing, and something more; and every antecedent term extends to more individuals than the subsequent.

When the comprehension of a substantive is the greatest, and its extension the smallest—that is, when it recalls all the attributes which characterize one individual—it is called *proper*. When the substantive recalls the attributes which are common to all the individuals of a species, it is called *common*. Proper nouns, then, are such as are applied to individual persons or things only, and they may be said to be in themselves utterly unmeaning. They were contrived simply for the purpose of showing what thing we talk about, and not of telling anything about it. A proper name may be either a single word, as *London*, *Paris*, *Vienna*; or a collocation of words, as *the President of the United States*, *the present Queen of Great Britain*, *the Emperor of all the Russias*, *the Mayor of New York*. The name of “many-worded” or “compound” noun has been given to words of this sort. Different from proper nouns, which designate individuals only, common nouns comprise whole classes, each class denoting an aggregate of attributes affirmed to exist in every individual to whom or to which the common noun applies. The word *man*, for instance, expresses certain qualities, and when we predicate it of one, or any number of persons, we assert that they all possess these qualities.

Common nouns are generally divided into three classes, called *abstract*, *collective*, and *verbal* nouns.

An *abstract noun* is the name of a quality or property thought of, apart from all consideration of the substance in which the quality resides. The term bears reference to an act of the mind called *abstraction*, by which we fix our attention on one property of an object, leaving the others out of view. Snow, chalk, writing-paper, are white, and, from that quality, may be oppressive to the eyes. Abstracting the quality from the substance, we can say, in speaking of some persons, that “*whiteness* is oppressive to their eyes.” *Whiteness* thus becomes an abstract noun. Most *abstract nouns* come from adjectives, and should be distinguished from *common nouns generalized*. *Wisdom*, *truth*, *fear*, *joy*, *kindness*, *probity*, are single qualities which may characterize an unlimited number of persons; but the names of *man*, *horse*, *gold*, *stone*, represent each an assemblage of attributes, the aggregate of which constitutes the individual or substance respectively so named. Ab-

stract nouns, when used as such, have no plurals, but common nouns generalized have.

Collective nouns are those which, though singular in form, may suggest the idea of plurality. Such are *army*, *clergy*, *crowd*, *regiment*, etc. The same word may be *collective* and *common*. "The Seventh Regiment," for instance, is a collective name and also a proper name, but it is not a common name; "a regiment" is both a collective and a common name—common with respect to all similar organizations, collective with respect to the number of soldiers of which any regiment is composed. As collective nouns, though singular in form, may yet suggest the idea of plurality, they are joined either to a singular or a plural verb, according as the idea suggested is that of unity or plurality. In other words, collective nouns expressing *totality* require the verb to be in the singular; whereas *partitive collective nouns* take the plural. The reason is, that partitive collectives, having no inherent meaning, derive their meaning from the words that follow; whereas the general collective presents the idea complete in itself, independently of any word or words that may be added. Thus, *army*, *clergy*, *crowd*, etc., however described or analyzed, stand before our mind as a whole, and as such govern their verbs in the sentence; whereas, *number*, *portion*, *part*, and the like, depending as they do upon a complement for their meaning, form, together with that complement, an expression the sense of which will determine the form of the verb of which it is the subject. Thus, the same term which is partitive collective in one case, may become general collective in another, according to the idea we may wish to convey. In French, for instance, *une partie des infidèles s'enfuirent*, would direct the mind to the soldiers who fled taken individually; *une partie des soldats s'enfuit*, to their collective numbers. So, in *une douzaine d'œufs*, the word *douzaine* is a general collective, because eggs are usually sold by that quantity; whereas, in *une douzaine de piastres*, it is partitive, as dollars are not counted by the dozen. The former, therefore, requires the verb in the singular, the latter in the plural number. So, in English, when we say, "The army is on its march," we seem to lose sight of the individuals composing the idea represented by the word *army*, and speak of it as one mass; but if we say, "The peasantry go barefooted," this mode of expression seems to give us an idea of a number of people existing separately, and we therefore put the verb in the plural. The truth is, that the idea of unity

or totality, and the idea of multiplicity, may be both involved in a collective noun, and it depends upon which idea predominates whether we shall make the verb singular or plural.

Verbal nouns are those which express the name of an action. In the sentence, "The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing," the words *seeing* and *hearing* are verbal nouns. The verb thus used as a noun is, of course, not conjugated—that is, united with a subject—but necessarily some part of the infinitive. In English it is generally the present participle, rarely the present. In French it is sometimes the past participle, but, as the subject of a preposition, it is more generally the present infinitive which makes the verb perform the function of a noun. *Entrée, sortie, levée, mêlée, mise, prise, du, parvenu*, are past participles used as common nouns; but, as abstract nouns, it is the present infinitive which is always used as such, as: *N'aimer que soi, c'est aimer peu de chose*. Verbal nouns have much the same relation to verbs that abstract nouns have to adjectives.

Substantives are modified in four ways—*number, gender, case, and degree*.

The numbers *singular* and *plural* distinguish substantives as signifying one or more than one individual of the same species, one or more than one species of the same genus; they consequently affect their extension, not their comprehension. This distinction is found in all languages, it being universally required to distribute the genus into its species, and the species into its individuals. Proper nouns, when strictly used as such, denoting single individuals, do not admit of a plural.

Number may be truly called an accident of a noun, for not only do we find languages differing as to the extent in which they indicate numbers, but we sometimes meet with words commonly said to be alike in both numbers—that is, in fact, without the distinction of number at all—and yet we do not experience any difficulty in indicating whether we mean one or more than one. In English, for instance, the words *sheep, deer, salmon, snipe, dozen, pair*, and others have no plural, although the ideas which they signify are susceptible of number. Words like these prove that the distinction could be dispensed with, at the same time that their fewness shows it to be a very useful one.

While all languages have number, they have them not all to the same extent. In Sanskrit, Hebrew, Arabic, Greek, and other ancient languages, there is a particular form called the *Dual*, which serves to indicate two individuals. Thus, in Greek *ἄροτρον* signifies *a* or *one* plowman; *ἄροτρα*, *two* plowmen; and *ἄροται*, any number of plowmen above two. [35]

In almost every idiom there are a few nouns which form their plurals quite anomalously. Irregularities like these can be generally traced to some older forms of language. Such are in English the words *child*, *cow*, *foot*, *goose*, *man*, *mouse*, *ox*, *tooth*, whose plurals are *children*, *kine*, *feet*, *geese*, *men*, *mice*, *oxen*, *teeth*. Others, again, have two different plurals with distinct meanings. *Brother*, for instance, has *brothers*, sons of the same parents, and *brethren*, members of the same society or profession. The former word is a true plural; the latter a kind of collective. Nouns adopted from dead or foreign tongues in some instances retain their original plurals. This, however, is more often an affectation than a necessity, which good writers rarely indulge in, the regular plural being always preferable when custom will in any degree permit it.

Distinction of sex has been marked in language by genders—the masculine and feminine—which indicate respectively the names of males and females. This is effected sometimes by distinct substantives, such as *man*, *woman*; *husband*, *wife*; *father*, *mother*; *son*, *daughter*; *boy*, *girl*; *uncle*, *aunt*; *nephew*, *niece*; *horse*, *mare*; *drake*, *duck*; *gander*, *goose*; etc. Sometimes, also, words applied to males and females indiscriminately are made to indicate gender by prefixing auxiliary words forming, with their primitives, compound nouns showing the distinction. Thus, in English, the word *servant* signifies either a male or a female; but, if we desire to designate which, we can use the compound words *man-servant* and *maid-servant*. Of the same kind are *he-goat* and *she-goat*, *cock-sparrow* and *hen-sparrow*, and many others. In other words the feminine is indicated by the suffix *ess* added to the root of the masculine, such as *abbott*, *abbess*; *actor*, *actress*; *governor*, *governess*; *duke*, *duchess*; and the like. If the masculine word is adopted from a dead or foreign tongue, the feminine is generally taken from the same language, as *czar*, *czarina*; *sultan*, *sultana*; *infant*, *infanta*; *hero*, *heroine*; etc.

Such are in the main the changes of form by means of which difference of sex is indicated in almost all languages. Masculine and feminine genders have, by analogy, been applied to the names of inanimate things, according as the nouns expressive of them were formed of grave or acute, harsh or agreeable sounds; but more often as the thing named bore supposed affinity to the male or the female kind. A third gender—the *neuter*—has been, in many languages, attached to the names of inanimate things and of animals considered abstractedly of sex. As genders arise from various causes in different languages, they vary in their application to particular substantives in each, and often present strange anomalies. Thus, in English, *man-of-war* is feminine; the German *Weib*, “married woman,” and *Mädchen*, “girl,” are neuter; the French *gens*, “people,” varies its gender, according as an adjective precedes or follows it, as *ce sont de charmantes gens*, or *des gens charmants*, “they are charming people.”

English is, on this point, the most consistent of all languages; it admits of masculine and feminine pronouns, denoting males and females of the human kind, and of a few of the most common species of the brute creation, and has no gender for other nouns, specific words being, for the greater part, joined to the names of the lower animals to mark their sex when distinction is required. Sometimes, however, it departs from this rule and assigns a masculine or feminine gender to a word that should strictly be considered neuter, as expressing a thing without life and consequently without the natural distinction of sex. The choice of gender in such cases seems to have been made capriciously, or at any rate to have been regulated by ideas whose operation on the language we can not now clearly trace.^[36] Still, this power of varying the gender of nouns gives an obvious advantage to English over other idioms in which gender is fixed. If we wish to speak of an object without feeling, we use its natural gender; but if we wish to produce a rhetorical effect, we use a masculine or feminine gender. The natural philosopher, referring to the sun merely as one of the component parts of a system, would properly enough use the pronoun *it*; but the poet, who wishes to excite a feeling of admiration for the object, would say *he*. In the same way the metaphysician, detailing a theory of virtue without wishing to awaken any feeling, would use *it*;^[37] but the poet, fired with love for the object, would say *she*.^[38]

The French language is, in respect to genders, very perplexing to foreigners, not only because it has but two—the masculine and feminine—but because they seem most arbitrarily distributed among its nouns. In some languages the gender of nouns often changes with their meanings, of which the French and German offer many examples. In Greek, Latin, and Italian some nouns even change their genders in passing from the singular to the plural. Close attention to these irregularities is the more imperative in inflected languages, as an ignorance of the gender of nouns brings several errors in its train, since articles, determinatives, adjectives, pronouns, and participles take different inflections according as the substantive to which they relate is either masculine, feminine, or neuter.

The nature of the relations which exist between ideas may be determined in language either by prepositions, by the respective places of the nouns, or by their change of form. Sometimes these three ways combine in the expression of relation.

The changes of form, which consist chiefly of inflections or variations in the termination of nouns, and which serve to denote the relation in which nouns stand to each other or any other part of the sentence, are called *cases*. The more numerous the cases, the more favorable to transpositive collocation is the language; whereas the absence of inflections confines its structure to one determinate order, because in that case the relations of words can be marked only by juxtaposition.

The number of cases varies considerably in different languages; the English has two, the German four, the Greek five, and the Latin six. The collection of the various inflected forms, assumed by a substantive in all its cases, is called *declension*; and the nouns which are susceptible of cases are said to be *declinable*. French, Spanish, and Italian, having no case system, are therefore said to be *indeclinable*, relations in these languages being expressed by situations or by prepositions. In referring to their grammar, it would be wrong, therefore, to speak of cases, for where there is no change of form there evidently is no case. It is true that in some of the old French and English grammars we find the word used to indicate relation, and this can only be accounted for in this way, that the first grammars of modern languages, having been molded on the Latin, a false analogy was established between its principles and those of modern idioms; and hence arose the improper

application of declensions to their substantives, although these are indeclinable. Each language has a particular genius which can not be transferred from one to another.

The *genitive* case, in English grammar called *possessive*, is of all the *oblique* cases—that is, those that are equivalent to prepositions—the most generally used. It represents a vast variety of relations, the principal one being that of ownership or possession, and as it involves an idea of appurtenance attributed to a second substantive, the noun so inflected may be virtually considered as an adjective modifying and restricting the signification of the second substantive. Hence it is that in several idioms the possessive, like an adjective, is placed before the substantive to which it relates.

In English the possessive singular is formed by adding 's (apostrophe s) to the noun in singular; the possessive plural, by adding an apostrophe alone to its plural form; and when the plural does not end in s, the possessive is formed like the singular,^[39] which inflections correspond in import exactly to the preposition *of*. The expressions “in his father’s house,” and “in the house of his father,” are as nearly as possible identical. In the one, the relation existing between *house* and *father* is expressed by a change in the word *father*; in the other, the same idea is expressed by the preposition *of*. Sometimes, however, there is a difference between these two modes of expression, as in the phrases “Lord’s day,” and “day of the Lord”; but this arises from the circumstance that both have lost their common meanings, and become, in fact, common proper nouns. The two are also not equivalent when *of* is used as an adverb; thus, though we can say “He spoke of Cæsar,” we can not say “He spoke Cæsar’s.”

Of the three means resorted to in language to indicate relation—inflection, preposition, and collocation—inflection is probably the oldest, as it requires much less *abstraction* to express the nature of the relation that exists between two objects by a change of form in one of them, than to call into use a class of words expressing relation and nothing else. Indeed, to express relation by a variation in the name of the correlative object, requiring neither abstraction nor generalization nor comparison of any kind, must at first have come more natural and easy than to express it by prepositions of which the first invention necessarily demanded some degree of all these operations. It is observable also that, while many languages, such as the French, Italian, and oth-

ers, have thrown off inflected forms, there is no instance of a language ever having reverted to the inflected form after using prepositions.

Substantives admit of degrees called *augmentatives* and *diminutives*. These degrees convey an idea of greatness or smallness, or of something pleasing, disagreeable, or contemptible, added to their comprehensions, and are indicated by a suffix or some other modification of the original word. In Greek, Latin, French, and English, this means of modifying the sense of the substantive exists in but a few instances; but both augmentatives and diminutives are very common in Spanish and Italian, in which almost all substantives can be so modified. All Dutch and German nouns admit of diminutives. These degrees impart copiousness, force, and grace to these languages; but, although scarce adequately represented in others by translation, their lack in original composition is but little felt, because the ideas conveyed by them are there habitually expressed by adjectives.

Adjectives

ADJECTIVES serve to distinguish substantives by additional qualities, properties, or modes of existence. They do not, as usually defined, express quality or property; they only predicate it in the substance—that is, they indicate that the thing signified by the substantive to which they relate possesses such additional qualities; and inasmuch as qualities, or attributes, have no separate existence apart from the substance to which they belong, adjectives are inseparable from their substantives, of which they form part and parcel.

The substantive, involving in its comprehension all the ideas of properties which constitute the class of things signified, takes no adjectives but such as predicate properties forming no essential part of that class. Adjectives, therefore, serve as terms of comparison to distinguish, by accessory ideas, the individuals which substantives signify from other individuals of the same species. Thus, when we affirm of a mountain that it is *lofty*, we must have a tacit reference to other mountains; when we affirm of any particular river that it is *rapid*, we unconsciously, perhaps, but yet actually, make a comparison between it and some other rivers. In calling an animal *big* or *little*, we always form a secret comparison between that animal and others of the same species; and it is that comparison which regulates our judgment concerning its greatness. A dog and a horse may be of the very same size, while the one is admired for the greatness of its bulk, and the other for the smallness. Adjectives, moreover, affect both the comprehension and extension of substantives; for they increase the first by the addition of a new idea, and diminish the second by confining the signification of the substantive to a smaller range of individuals. The word *rose*, for instance, embraces the whole class; *white rose*, only a subclass or species; with the additional property of *whiteness* our concep-

tion of the substance is increased, while all roses not so distinguished are excluded from our consideration.

The natural union which exists between the substance and its attributes has produced the logical connection between the subject and the predicate, and led to the adoption of means by which a corresponding connection is established between the substantive and the adjective. In German, Greek, Latin, and other inflected idioms, this connection is effected by the adjective being made to agree, in gender, number, and case, with its substantive—that is to say, to assume different inflections which correspond to and harmonize with those of the substantive viewed in these three parts. Nouns in French, Spanish, and Italian, having no cases, their adjectives agree with them in gender and number only. In English, adjectives have neither number, gender, nor case; and their relation to the substantive is marked by their being placed immediately before it. This peculiarity of construction, which belongs also to the Dutch and German, enables substantives to be converted into qualificative adjectives by being so placed, as *gold watch*, *stone wall*, *brick house*; sometimes united by a hyphen, as *rail-fence*, *steam-engine*, *book-learning*; and in course of time even coalescing into single words, as *railroad*, *steamboat*, *schoolmaster*, etc. The facility of thus multiplying attributive terms imparts to a language great descriptive powers, and is most favorable to poetical and oratorical effects.

Single-worded adjectives are, in reality, only abridged forms of expression, and are not even absolutely necessary to impart to the noun additional ideas of quality, property, or mode of existence; indeed, many languages have no adjectives corresponding to those found in other idioms. Thus, the Latin *aureus*, *argenteus*, *ferreus*, etc., and their corresponding *gold*, *silver*, *iron*, in English, *golden*, *silbern*, *eisern*, in German, are rendered in French by their circumstantial attributes *d'or*, *d'argent*, *de fer*. This language, in common with all others of the classical stock, generally supplies the absence of attributive terms by adjectival phrases composed of prepositions and substantives, as *maison de briques*, *chemin de fer*, *bateau à vapeur*, *arrangement à l'amiable*, etc. Deprived of the advantage of converting nouns into qualificative adjectives, it is endowed with others equally great. It changes its nouns into attributes by withholding the determinative, as: *Il était berger et il devint roi*; while it converts almost every adjective into a

noun by means of some determinative, as: *Rien n'est beau que le vrai; le sage est toujours content; c'est un petit paresseux; venez ici mon brave*, etc. But what in French is a peculiar source of wealth and beauty to the language is the shade of meaning and often the double sense of its adjectives, arising from their position; for, although they are generally placed after substantives, they occasionally precede them when used emphatically or figuratively in the sentence.

The qualities or properties which it is the purport of adjectives to predicate in substantives are susceptible of different degrees of intensity; the excess or deficiency of the quality suggested by any particular adjective may also be considered absolutely or relatively to that of another. All languages possess modes of indicating these various degrees, to which have been given the names of *comparative*, *superlative relative*, and *superlative absolute*. These degrees of comparison are expressed either by adverbs placed before the adjectives, as in French, or by a change in the termination, as in Greek, Latin, and German. It is this change in the form of adjectives which properly deserves the name of *degrees of comparison*. In Italian and Spanish the comparative and the superlative relative are indicated by adverbs only; but the superlative absolute is formed either by an adverb corresponding to the English word *much*, or by a particular inflection of the adjective. English admits of both ways, the comparatives and relative superlatives of words of one syllable being formed by the suffixes *er* and *est*, and those of longer words, especially such as are derived from the French and Latin, by means of the adverbs *more* and *most*. Such, at least, is the practice in modern English, which says *younger, older; tallest, smallest*; but *more* or *most* virtuous, *more* or *most* famous, and no longer, as Milton has it, *virtuousest, famousest*. The superlative absolute is marked by the word *very*. The rule laid down by English grammarians, that the comparative is to be used when two things are spoken of, and the superlative relative when more than two are the subject of discourse, has not been always observed, even by the best writers,^[40] and still less by the best speakers. In the present state of the language, it may be safe, perhaps, to say that, while in colloquial language the superlative is allowed when two are implied, yet if two are distinctly compared, the comparative is the better form to use.

The degrees of comparison have different import, according as they are applied to relative or absolute properties. In the first instance,

they show an excess in one property over another, or over several, without reference to a positive or definite standard; thus, if we say *one line is longer than another*, or *is the longest*, we do not, thereby, imply that either of them is long, or approaching to any particular length—this property being relative. In the second instance, when absolute properties are compared, the degrees of comparison mark not so much an increase of property, as an approach to the definite property expressed by the adjective in the positive state: by saying *one line is straighter than another*, or *is the straightest*, we mean that it approaches nearer, or the nearest to *straightness*.

Determinatives

DETERMINATIVES serve chiefly to limit the meaning of common substantives from a general to a particular sense. They have been classed by some as adjectives, merely because, like adjectives, they are joined to substantives of whose signification they usually restrict the extension. This confusion, arising from a false denomination, would probably not have been made, had adjectives, as suggested by some modern grammarians, been more properly called *modificatives* or *qualificatives*, and their functions more strictly defined. *Adjective* does not simply mean “added to”; it denotes a mode of action or existence, a quality or property not found in the noun to which the word is added. The termination *ive*, for instance, which in general has an active sense, imparts an active quality to the noun to which the term is added. *Destructive* does not mean “destroying” or “destroyed,” but “causing destruction.” *Corrosive* means “gnawing, consuming, wearing away,” and predicates the power of producing such effects in the substance to the name of which this adjective is added. Adjectives may even, in some instances, represent their nouns when the quality they impart is the leading quality expressed, as, “the living and the dead; the rich and the poor; the learned and the ignorant,” etc. Not so the determinatives. They never represent a noun by referring to quality or mode of existence; two of them can never come together; they can not form the third term of a proposition; nor do they admit of degrees of comparison. The difference will be more obvious still when we observe that adjectives increase the comprehension of substantives, whereas determinatives affect their extension only.

Determinatives may be divided into three classes—*possessive*, *demonstrative*, and *numeral*.

The English words *my*, *thy*, *his*, *her*, *its*, *our*, *your*, *their*, and their corresponding forms in other idioms, are *determinatives* called *posses-*

sive, from the idea of possession which they attach to the nouns before which they are placed. In reference to the possessor, they may with equal propriety be called *pronominal determinatives*, as they sometimes are styled; but they are not pronouns, their function being to designate nouns, and not to supply their place. The corresponding Latin words *meus, mea, meum, tuus, tua, tuum*, etc., are either pronouns or determinatives, as they signify *mine* or *my*, *thine* or *thy*, etc. —determinatives when accompanying their nouns; pronouns when representing them. In the same way, the English word *his* is either pronoun or determinative, according to its function in the sentence.

Numerals are subdivided into three classes: *Cardinal*, answering the question, How many? *Ordinal*, answering the question, Which number? And *Indefinite*, which simply refer to number, without specifying which or what number. Of these the *ordinal numbers* are true adjectives, for they convey an idea of order, and consequently increase the comprehension of the substantive, at the same time that they restrict its extension. The *cardinal numbers* are determinatives and not adjectives, inasmuch as they express no mode of action or existence, no quality attributable to the thing signified by the substantive, but affect the extension only, and not the comprehension of the noun before which they are placed. When used by themselves with tacit reference to particular nouns, the cardinal numbers become pronouns, as: *two heads are better than one*, in which *two* is a determinative, and *one* a pronoun. When used abstractedly, as in *two and two are four*, they are neither determinatives nor pronouns, but abstract nouns. The *indefinite numbers* are determinatives that only vaguely refer to quality, such as *some, several, few, any, many*, etc. Some of these words, it is true, may, by the suppression of the substantive, be used as pronouns; but, when joined to substantives, and performing the same function as determinatives, they can only be classed with the latter part of speech, and not with pronouns or adjectives.

The English words *this, that, these, those*, and their corresponding forms in other languages, are called *demonstrative determinatives*, from their pointing, in a clear and distinct manner, to the nouns they designate. In this respect the word *the* does not as fully determine the sense of the substantive, but only indicates that the latter is to be taken in a definite sense, which is further specified by a complement. *This* and *these* refer to what is nearest in time or place, to persons

and things present or under immediate consideration; *that* and *those* to what is more distant, to persons and things not present or under immediate consideration. But it is not always by presence or absence, proximity or distance, that men and things are designated; it is even more generally by some special quality, some circumstance or description, that they are distinguished from other men and things, and for this purpose the word *the*, which in reality is but a softened form of *that*, is used as less emphatic when details concerning the noun are all found in its complement, whether expressed or understood. Thus we say: *This man is rich; that man is poor*—pointing at the individuals; but we say: *The man who built that house is rich; the rich are apt to despise the poor*. It is this difference in the use of *the* and *that* which has led many grammarians to consider the former as a separate part of speech, under the name of *definite article*. In the same way, the word *a*, which is only a shortened form of *an*, and whose equivalent in many languages is no other than the numeral *one*,^[41] has been called an *indefinite article*; so might *any*, which is only a more emphasized form thereof; but as both *the* and *a* come, in all respects, under the definition of determinatives, it is unnecessary, and even illogical, to rank them as a class by themselves.

Proper substantives, denoting individuals in a determinate manner, require, in general, no article. Greek and Italian are among the languages which present some exceptions to this rule. In Italian, the article is often used before the names of celebrated persons, poets, and artists, as, *il Dante, il Tasso, la Grisi, la Patti*, etc., which custom has prevailed for some time, also, in French. Names of countries, rivers, and mountains, in Greek, French, Italian, and Spanish, also take the article, which, however, is sometimes dispensed with in French before the names of countries, especially when used with the prepositions *de* and *en*, as *la carte d'Europe; vin d'Espagne; l'empereur d'Autriche; il voyage en Italie; nous arrivons de France*. In French, the article also serves to indicate an entire class, as distinct from any other, as, *Les femmes ont la sensibilité en partage, mais la force est l'apanage des hommes*. The absence of the article in English, by which is consistently indicated the greatest extension of the common substantive—that is, its general sense or signification of a class—is an advantage which this language possesses over many others.

In inflected languages, determinatives, like adjectives, vary to agree in gender and number with their substantives, and thus they serve to point out these distinctions in the latter when not sufficiently marked by their form. This is more particularly the case in French, in which the written form of substantives seldom affords a clue to their gender, and not always to their number; but, in languages in which the distinction of masculine and feminine is consistent with that of sex, or in which the form of the plural is perceptible both to the eye and to the ear, the determinatives seldom vary in gender and number, as is the case in English. Their invariability permits the same determinative to refer to several consecutive substantives, as *the father, mother, and children*; but, when they are variable, as in French, they must be repeated in their various forms before every noun, as, *le père, la mère, et les enfants*.

Determinatives, and especially the article, contribute in a considerable degree to the precision and perspicuity of discourse; but, useful as they are, several languages dispense with some of them, in which case their place is supplied by particular terminations and suffixes added to the nouns.^[42]

Verbs

The chief office of the **VERB** is to denote a relation of co-existence between the substantive and its attributes. The verb *to be*, which denotes the simple existence of the attribute in the subject, has been considered by many grammarians as the only real verb; it is, indeed, sufficient, in combination with adjectives, to express all judgments. The verbs which include the attributes in their signification have been called *attributive*, in contradistinction to *substantive*, a denomination given to the abstract verb *to be*. The attributive verb, like the adjective, qualifies the subject, but it qualifies it with the additional ideas of *affirmation, time, manner, number, person*, and sometimes even *gender*. It is this multiple office which makes it the most complex, and at the same time the most important and most useful of all words.

When the attributive verb denotes an action performed by the subject, it is called *active*; when it denotes an action suffered by the subject, it is called *passive*; and when it denotes neither, but signifies a mode of existence, it is called *neuter*.

The action expressed by an active verb may relate to an extraneous object toward which it is directed, and which completes the idea; the word denoting this complement of the action is called *object*. The action may be absolute—that is, may remain within its agent; it is then complete in itself, and does not require an object. Hence two sorts of active verbs, the *transitive* and the *intransitive*.

The transitive verb may reach its object directly, or by means of a preposition; the first is called *transitive-direct*, the second *transitive-indirect*; and their respective objects are called accordingly *direct* and *indirect* objects. The direct object, in our modern idioms, corresponds to the Latin and Greek accusatives, and the indirect to an oblique case, including the preposition in its composition.

The same verb may be transitive-direct with regard to one thing, and transitive-indirect with regard to another; it has then two objects, one direct and another indirect, as: *I received a book from my father; I gave a book to my brother.*

With some verbs that have two objects, one direct and the other indirect, the latter becomes its direct object when the former is omitted, as, *He teaches me music*, and *He teaches me*, either of which allows the passive form, *music is taught*, and *I am taught*. In French, the verb *payer* is transitive-direct in regard to both the person paid and the amount paid him, when mentioned separately, as *Je l'ai payé*, "I have paid him," and *J'ai payé une forte somme*, "I have paid a large sum"; but, when both person and amount are mentioned, the verb *payer* is transitive-direct in regard to the amount paid, and transitive-indirect in regard to the person to whom the payment is made; and "I have paid him a large sum" is rendered by *Je lui ai payé une forte somme*. "We pay that man two dollars a day" can be rendered by *Nous payons à cet homme deux dollars par jour*, or *Nous payons cet homme à raison de deux dollars par jour*; the former stating the amount paid and the person to whom it is paid, and the latter mentioning the man who is paid and the rate at which he is paid.

The greater number of transitive verbs can be used intransitively; and it frequently happens that a verb is transitive in one language and intransitive in another, or transitive-direct in the one and transitive-indirect in the other, according as the idea expressed by it was originally considered absolutely or relatively. Thus, *to enjoy* is transitive-direct in English, the French *jouir* is transitive-indirect; *to listen* is transitive-indirect, *écouter* is transitive-direct; *to love God* is rendered in Spanish by *amar á Dios*.

When two objects are attached to a transitive verb, not only are these often differently placed in different languages, but sometimes, also, the object which is direct in the one happens to be indirect in the other, as, *I lost sight of that*, which is translated into French by *j'ai perdu cela de vue*.

When the subject of a transitive verb, whether direct or indirect, is also its complement or object, that verb is called *reflective*. The active verb denotes an action done; the passive, an action received; and the reflective, an action done and received. The reflective verb is the opposite of the neuter; for it is both active and passive, whereas the latter

is neither the one nor the other. Yet, in practice, these two opposite forms are frequently equivalent to each other in different languages; many neuter verbs in English, for example, are rendered by reflective verbs in French, Italian, and Spanish. The reason is, that reflective and neuter verbs have this in common, that their action extends not to any outward object, but remains within the agent.

The passive verb is, in some languages, a distinct word altogether, and is formed from the active by a change in the termination. In a greater number of modern languages there is no passive verb;^[43] its place is supplied by a periphrasis consisting of the verb *to be*, and the past participle expressive of the action suffered by the subject. Transitive-direct verbs alone can assume the passive form; and the latter may always be changed into the active.

Exceptions to this rule, supposed to exist in English, are more apparent than real. Although this language, in common with many others, has no distinct form of passive—such as the Latin *amo*, I love; *amor*, I am loved—it has, nevertheless, all the means of giving its verbs a passive sense by the aid of the auxiliary verb *to be*. A proneness of English to use that verb leads to the frequent use of the transitive-direct as passive, which custom it even extends—at least, apparently so—to transitive-indirect verbs. Thus, *to be spoken to* is a form of expression which is decidedly passive, and very correctly so, for although *to speak* is a transitive-indirect verb, *to speak to* is a compound transitive-direct or active verb, the meaning of which is *to address*. So, in I am told, the verb *to tell* has evidently the sense of *to inform*, which, in reference to the person informed, is transitive-direct, and, consequently, can be changed into the passive. The English compound-neuter verbs, which are formed by the adjunction of an adverb, as *to look up*, *to run away*, can not as such be changed into the passive; but, if further compounded with a preposition, they assume the office of active verbs, and can be used in the passive voice, as, *He is looked up to by them; he was run away with*.

The power of substituting the active for the passive form, and *vice versa*, affords the means of drawing the attention more forcibly on either the subject or the object, as may be deemed preferable. Although the active and the passive form can generally be substituted one for the other, they are not indiscriminately used by all nations alike. The

English, as we have just remarked, are inclined to prefer the passive; the French, Italian, Spanish, and German, the active and reflective.

A verb, whether active or neuter, is said to be *impersonal* when the action or state which it expresses is conceived abstractly of an agent, a pronoun of the third person singular being, in some languages, used for a subject, but without reference to any conception, and merely to keep up the general analogy with other verbs. Impersonal verbs can have no first or second person, as these would imply the idea of an agent; they have only the third person, and in languages that have three genders for the pronoun third person singular, it is generally the neuter which is used, as: *it rains; it hails*; in French, *il pleut; il grêle*. When the inflections of the verb are sonorous enough to dispense with the pronoun, as in Latin, the third person of the verb alone is sufficient, as *pluit; grandinat*.

Consciousness, doubt, supposition, desire, will, which are different states of the mind in the conception of thought and the expression of judgments, demand corresponding forms in the verbs by which such states of mind may be manifested in the communication of ideas. These forms, called *moods*, are distinguished by particular inflections, or by auxiliary words, according as the language is more or less inflected. They mark the different modes of assertion; in other words, the relations in which the various propositions of discourse stand to each other, whether they are affirmative or conditional, deliberative or suppositive, imperative or optative, principal or subordinate.

The number of moods varies in different languages, but those most generally found in ancient and modern languages are the *indicative*, the *conditional* or *potential*, the *imperative*, the *subjunctive*, and the *infinitive*.

All the judgments which we form relate either to the past, the present, or the future. This triple circumstance has given rise to the *tenses* of verbs, which, like the moods, are distinguished either by particular inflections in their final syllables, or by means of auxiliary verbs and expletives. The different degrees of proximity to the present, or remoteness from it, and the definiteness or vagueness of the epoch alluded to, as well as the relative periods at which various actions may be performed, have introduced among nations great diversity in the import and number of tenses. Grammarians are by no means agreed as to the names by which to distinguish these tenses; in different lan-

guages they are often known by apparently opposite names; similar names sometimes indicate different tenses; and tenses which seem to correspond in two or more idioms are not always used in similar circumstances.

The indicative mood, for instance, expresses categorical affirmation, and its present tense indicates primarily that smallest possible portion of time which connects the past with the future. There can be thus logically but one present tense, and still the English language has three different forms which, while they all refer to the present, convey additional ideas which in some cases are the more prominent.

The form *I love* is used to indicate not so much a present action as a *habit*; thus, "I love to read." It is often called the present indefinite.

Monarchs seldom *condescend* to become the preceptors of their subjects. (Gibbon.)

I do love, called the present emphatic, indicates not only present time, but affirms with *intensity* or in opposition to a denial.

Excellent wretch! perdition seize my soul, but I *do* love thee. (Shakespeare.)

I am loving, the present definite or progressive, indicates present time and progressive action.^[44]

An author who waits till all requisite materials are accumulated to his hands, *is* but *watching* the stream that will run on forever. (Hallam.)

The form *I was loving* is called the *imperfect* or *past progressive*, and indicates past time and progressive action.

One evening, as the emperor *was returning* to the palace through a dark and narrow portico in the amphitheatre, an assassin, who waited his passage, rushed upon him with a drawn sword, loudly exclaiming, "The Senate sends you this!" (Gibbon.)

The English *perfect* is used to indicate, not past action, but the present result of a past action. If I say, "*Livy writes*," or "*Livy has written* so and so," I imply that the book containing the incident is now extant. But if I say, "*Livy wrote* so and so," I should naturally be taken to be speaking of something reported as having been written in one of the books of his history which have been lost. We may say of a sick man yet living, "He has lost much strength during the week." But the moment he is dead, we can no longer thus speak: we must say, "He lost much strength during the week." If I say, "I have seen Naples

twice," I carry the period during which my assertion is true through my whole life down to the present time. If I say, "I saw Naples twice," my words simply refer to the fact, and the period to which they refer is understood to have terminated. I mean, in my youth, or when I was in Europe, or the like. Sometimes the difference between the two tenses may convey an interesting moral distinction. If I say, "My father left me an injunction to do this or that," I leave the way open to say, "but now circumstances have changed, and I find another course more advisable." If I say, "My father has left me an injunction to do this or that," I imply that I am at this moment obeying, and mean to obey, that injunction. The perfect tense is, in fact, a present, relating to the effect, at the present time, of some act done in the past.^[45]

The *perfect indefinite*, *I loved*, indicates completed action within a period fully expired. It corresponds to the French past definite.^[46]

The militia *fell* much to decay during these two reigns. (Hume.)

Tarquin now *determined* on war; and at the head of the armies of Veii and Tarquinii he *marched* against the Romans. (Tytler.)

This is the tense commonly used in relating historical events, and hence we find it sometimes called *the historical past*. Like the *present*, it has also an emphatic form.

Anarchy and disorder *did not prevail* in the country, because the throne was elective; but the throne became elective because the people were too jealous of their privilege to admit of hereditary succession. (Alison.)

The *pluperfect*, *I had loved*, shows that something was completed before something else, mentioned along with it, took place. This tense corresponds to both the *pluperfect* and *preterite anterior* in French, which tenses in that language are not employed indiscriminately.^[47]

He *had lost* his wife while he was governor of the Lionnese Gaul. (Gibbon.)

He was opposed by the consuls Brutus and P. Valerius, who *had been chosen* in the room of Collatinus, and in the battle which ensued Brutus was killed. (Tytler.)

The *future* tense, *I shall* or *will love*, indicates an action yet to take place.^[48] The English language is superior to most others in having two auxiliaries to express two different shades of futurity;^[49] the difficulty is to distinguish these two shades correctly, and it may be doubted whether the distinction has been always strictly observed by

even the best speakers and writers. According to rule, *will* imports the will or purpose of the person it is joined with; *shall* implies the will of one who promises or threatens to do something, causes it to be done, permits it, commands it, or the like; with this restriction, however, that, in the first person, *shall* simply foretells, while *will* threatens or promises; but, in the second and third persons, *will* foretells, while *shall* promises or threatens—a nice distinction between different shades of future, but a very perplexing one to foreigners, and even to some natives.^[50]

The correct use of *shall* and *will* is shown in the following sentences:

Charles, I thank thee for they love to me, which thou *shalt* find I *will* most kindly requite. (Shakespeare.)

Yes, my son, I *will* point out the way, and my soul *shall* guide yours in the ascent, for we *will* take our flight together. (Goldsmith.)

I propose to write the history of England, etc. I *shall* recount the errors which, etc. I *shall* trace the course of that revolution, etc. It *will* be my endeavor to relate, etc. (Macaulay.)

The only book that I *shall* mention is Burnet's "History of the Reformation." (Hallam.)

By this process we *shall* be enabled to estimate the depth and richness of an historian's knowledge. (Arnold.)

The writer of this discourse *will* feel himself happy should his example stimulate any of his brethren. (Hall.)

If the fanaticism of religion have devastated kingdoms, the fanaticism of irreligion *will* pass as a deluge of blood over the field of the civilized world. (Taylor.)

But a torrent, imprudently resisted, *will*, in time, acquire that impetuous force which carries everything before it. (Tytler.)

Rome *shall* perish—write that word
In the blood that she has spilt. (Cowper.)

The *imperative* is used for entreating as well as for commanding. *Kill him; Don't hurt me; Go, and success attend you; Take it if you like*, express successively command, entreaty, wish, and permission; its name, indicating only one of its functions, is consequently defective. As this mood implies futurity in the action expressed, a future tense is often used in its place. *Steal not and thou shalt not steal* have the same

signification. Sometimes, also, it implies concession, as, *Love me, or love me not, it is all the same to me.*

When a fact is asserted, not as actual but merely as possible or contingent, it is expressed by the *subjunctive mood*, also called *conjunctive*, because the contingent assertion is usually marked by a conjunction. This mood, as indicated by its more usual name, is confined to the expression of subordinate or subjoined propositions; it implies the existence of a primary proposition, either expressed or understood, on which it depends. The principles which govern its use vary considerably in different languages, and are often very perplexing to foreigners. It rarely happens that French and English subjunctives are rendered one by the other in expressing the same ideas.^[51]

The *infinitive*, different from the other moods, affirms the existence of an attribute abstractly, and without the limitation of person and number. The *present* of the infinitive is, in most languages, used as an abstract noun—a grammatical principle which is general in German, Spanish, and Italian, but much restricted in French and in English.

The *participle* denotes time and attribute divested of affirmation; it implies the existence of a subject, but without designation of persons. The name *participle* was given to this part of the verb from its partaking of the nature of both the adjective and the verb. In the sentences, *He is reading; He is a reading man*, the first *reading* represents an act going on, but the second a habit. The Greek and Latin languages admit of past, present, and future participles; modern idioms have, for the greater part, only the present and the past. The participle is, in inflected languages, variable or invariable, according as it performs the office of adjective or verb. The principles which govern its variations in French, and particularly those of the past participle, require a most careful attention.

The present participle varies considerably in its application in different languages; it is used in Greek, English, and German, both as an adjective and as an abstract noun; in Latin and French it may be converted into an adjective only, and in Italian and Spanish it is altogether inconvertible. The present of the infinitive and the present participle may become the subjects or objects of a verb, according as the language admits of either part of the verb being converted into a noun. In the classical ancient languages the participle has given rise

to certain forms called gerund and supine, which admit of cases, and which may be considered as verbal substantives. This convertibility of the verb into a substantive is attended with great advantage to a language; it gives it flexibility and copiousness, and affords considerable facility for following the generation and logical association of ideas.

However limited some languages may be in the system of their tenses, the deficiency is more apparent than real, because all circumstances of time for which one language has tenses can be rendered into one which has them not by means of adverbs of time, or by combinations of words constituting verbal phrases, thus *I am writing* is rendered in French by *Je suis à écrire*, or *Je suis en train d'écrire*. *J'écrivais des thèmes* is expressed in English by *I was writing*, or *I used to write exercises*.

To establish more closely the relation between subject and verb, the latter is generally made to undergo changes corresponding to the number of the subject. The person who speaks, the one spoken to, and the one spoken of, are also known by particular final syllables, which in primitive languages can be easily resolved into the addition of the pronoun to the simple elementary form of the verb with which this pronoun has coalesced. Greek, Latin, Italian, and Spanish verbs admit of inflections sufficiently distinct and sonorous to preclude the necessity of using personal pronouns subject, so that they are by themselves the collective expressions of a judgment in its three essential elements—the subject, predicate, and relation of co-existence with the additional ideas of affirmation, time, number, and person; thus, in Latin, *studeo*, *I study*, and, in Italian, *parlerà*, *he will speak*, constitute complete propositions. In other idioms, as English, French, and German, pronouns are indispensable accompaniments to the verbs, except sometimes in the imperative, as *parle*, *speak*, which is equally a perfect proposition; for it implies an agent and an act, while it couples the idea of the act of speaking with the idea of a person addressed.

Some languages carry concord so far as to admit of genders in such a manner that it can be known by the termination of the verb whether the subject is masculine or feminine. In most modern languages this principle is sacrificed to a form of politeness which consists in using the plural of the second person for the singular. In French, and more particularly in Italian, it is both courteous and elegant to address strangers in the third person; in Spanish this form is almost generally

employed. But the German language surpasses all the others in forms of politeness; for, besides all these anomalies which it has in common with them, it expresses a still higher degree of courtesy by the use of the verb in the third person plural, with a subject in the singular. In Greek, a plural neuter noun often governs the verb in the singular, and in English, as already noticed, a singular collective noun sometimes governs it in the plural.

The collection of the different moods, tenses, persons, numbers, and genders which constitute a verb is called *conjugation*. To state in succession all these different parts is to *conjugate*. Verbs which follow general principles of analogy are said to be *regular*; those which deviate from these general forms are called *irregular*. The tendency is to be regular. Many verbs that used to have two forms for their past tense, such as *bore, bare, swore, sware, spoke, spake*, now take only the former. The regular Saxon termination for the past participle was *en*, and it appeared in many verbs, such as *proven, holpen, waxen*, where we now find *proved, helped, waxed*. Irregularities that have remained, founded on considerations of euphony, are always the remnants of some older forms of language. The expediency of this subdivision into regular and irregular verbs is a mere matter of opinion among grammarians; but, under whatever head the conjugations are classed, the study of the various changes which the verbs undergo to express all the views of the mind, and the constant practice of conjugating verbs of all sorts, regular and irregular, active, passive, neuter, and reflexive, in all moods and tenses, and in all forms, affirmative, negative, interrogative, and negative-interrogative, and above all in the formation of clauses and sentences, stand foremost among the indispensable means and exercises to acquire the practical knowledge of any foreign language.

Pronouns

A PRONOUN is generally defined as being “a word that supplies the place of a noun,” yet the noun would not in all cases express precisely the idea conveyed by the pronoun. Pronouns have an emphasis and individuality about them which no noun can have. They can not be considered as mere substitutes for the names of the persons for whom they stand; and, in writing or conversation, no mere name will so clearly designate the person intended as the appropriate pronoun. *I* and *thou* especially involve the notion of a person speaking and a person spoken to, and the relation between them—an idea that can not be expressed by any name. The fact, then, that they prevent the too frequent repetition of the noun, is to be considered rather as an accidental advantage belonging to them, than as being a full account of their nature.

Pronouns may be viewed as a sort of algebraic terms, having of themselves no determinate import, but taking any which circumstances give them. They may apply to all things and to all persons, and yet they specify in the most definite manner the subject of thought so that they are at the same time the most indefinite and yet the most definite of all words. From their frequent use, and their varied combination with the other elements of the sentence, they require our special attention, the more so as they are in many languages very irregular in their form, concord, and place. The syntactical rules which regulate the use of pronouns in different idioms present, perhaps, greater contrast than those regarding any other class of words.

In some respects pronouns are a species of nouns, since they express the same ideas as this part of speech; but, whilst nouns represent objects by their qualities, which are inherent to them, and independently of any other consideration, pronouns represent them in relation to the act of speaking; they, as it were, indicate the parts, or *dramatis personæ*, which the subjects of discourse perform. Hence substan-

tives have been sometimes called *absolute nouns*, and pronouns *relative nouns*. The phrase *John saw James* states a simple fact, without showing who speaks, who is spoken to, or who is spoken of; for we may be ignorant who John and James are; but the introduction of the pronouns in *I saw you*, *I saw him*, *you saw me*, and the like, tells both the fact and the actors.

The proper noun, as already noticed, represents only one individual, and the common noun all the individuals of one species or one genus; but the pronoun may represent everything; its extension is greater and its comprehension smaller than any substantive; it is not, therefore, barely its substitute, as the common definition implies. The extension of the pronoun being essentially unlimited, its import is determined by a substantive, and sometimes by an entire proposition expressed before, and of which it holds the place.

Pronouns may be divided into *personal*, *possessive*, *relative*, *demonstrative*, and *indefinite*. They all agree in gender, number, and person with the nouns for which they stand, and whether for this purpose they change their form or not, they are in all respects treated as the nouns would have been had they been used.

The personal pronouns *I*, *thou*, *he*, *she*, *it*, *we*, *you*, *they*, and their objectives *me*, *thee*, *him*, *her*, *it*, *us*, *you*, *them*, serve to distinguish the speaker, the person spoken to, and the person spoken of. It may be interesting to notice the various forms of these pronouns, which are very irregular; *I*, for example, bearing no sort of etymological relation to the word set down as its objective *me*, nor the word set down as its plural *we*—an irregularity existing in almost every language. The probability is that *I* and *me* were originally indeclinable, and used at different times or in different places both as subjects and objects. This seems to be proved by the variety of dialects which still prevail in different parts where these forms are often used indiscriminately the one for the other. *We* is employed instead of *I* by sovereigns in addressing their subjects, and by authors, editors, and the like, with the view of avoiding the appearance of self-importance in the use of that most personal of all words, *I*. In German, French, Italian, and Spanish, pronouns of the second person singular denote familiarity or contempt. This pronoun in English is used exclusively by a religious sect, or reserved for the elevated or poetical style.

The possessive pronouns *mine, thine, his, hers, its, ours, yours, theirs*, serve to represent objects possessed. They must not be confounded with the possessive determinatives *my, thy, his, her, its, our, your, their*, which do not represent objects possessed, but only determine the sense of objects actually named, whereas possessive pronouns supply their places by themselves. The distinction is important, as in inflected languages determinatives agree in gender and number with the things possessed, whereas the English *his, her, and its*, in addition to their designating the thing possessed, also indicate the gender of the possessive, which peculiarity, however, applies to the third person singular only, and in no way affects the function of these words in the sentence, and hence not their classification.

All pronouns refer to some noun, which, as it generally goes before, gets the name of *antecedent*, but, as it may come after, ^[52] *correlative* would appear a better term. In the case of one class of pronouns, the reference is so obvious and immediate, that they have been called *relative*, by way of distinction. They are *who, whose, whom, which, that, as*. Of these, *who* is used when the reference is to a person; *which*, when it is a thing; *that* and *as* refer either to persons or to things. *Who, which, and that*, and their corresponding forms in all languages, immediately follow the noun to which they refer, which, of course, includes the adjective or adjectival phrases that qualify it; ^[53] but, between *as* and its correlative, other words may be interposed to a limited extent. ^[54] The objective forms *whom, which, and that* are not infrequently omitted. *The first school I was at* is, colloquially at least, as good English as *the first school which I was at*; and though the omission is condemned by some grammarians, it is authorized by the usage of the best writers. When the relative refers to two correlatives of different genders, the omission is considered preferable; as, *The lady and gentleman we met yesterday; the man and the horse we met*. *That* is generally preferred to *who* or *which* when the correlative has an adjective joined to it, especially if that adjective is in the superlative, as: *Solomon was the wisest king that ever sat on the throne of Israel. The juggler is the last person that would let the spectators into his own secret*. In former times, *who* and *whom*, like *he* and *him*, applied also to animals and things, while *which* was not infrequently applied to persons, as we find it in the Lord's Prayer; but, now that the application of each is settled, we find *whose* representing *of which* almost as often as it represents *of whom*,

of which it is in reality the possessive,^[55] corresponding to the French word *dont*, which is likewise said of both persons and things.^[56] The *relative* pronoun is sometimes called *conjunctive*, when connecting a subjoined proposition with its antecedents, and *interrogative* when relating to a subjoined interrogative proposition. In form they are alike, and answer the purpose of both. In *Who did it?* *who* is an interrogative; in *Show me the man who did it*, *who* is a conjunctive pronoun. When *what* is not used to ask a question, it is a compound relative pronoun including both *that* and *which*. *I will give you what you want* is equivalent to saying *I will give you the thing which you want*.

The demonstrative pronouns *this*, *that*, *these*, *those*, to which we may add *the former* and *the latter*, must not be confounded with similar words used as determinatives. The distinction will be clearly shown by comparing them with their corresponding French forms *celui*, *celle*, *ceux*, *celles*, representing persons and objects well defined, and the words *ceci* and *cela* applying to things and facts in a more vague manner;^[57] as, *celui qui vous parle*, in which *celui* represents a man; *celle qui vous aime*, in which *celle* represents a woman—quite different from *ce*, *cet*, and *cette*, which are demonstrative determinatives, and always accompany the nouns they designate. *Ci* or *là* added to the noun so designated convey the idea of proximity or distance, and impart the same idea to the demonstrative pronoun to which they are added. They are generally followed by *de*, *qui*, *dont*, if not by their particles *ci* or *là*.^[58]

The indefinite pronouns are *one*, *some*, *either*, *neither*, and in general all indefinite determinatives when performing the office of nouns vaguely referred to in the sentence. Among these must be classed the French word *on*, the German *man*, and the English *one* or *people*, all meaning exactly the same, and all used alike for a subject not specified, as: *on dit*; *man sagt*; *one says*, or *people say*—all equivalent to the idiomatic passive form *it is said*. Notice that the English pronoun *one* is only accidentally spelled like the unit *one*, its elder form in Norman French being *ome*, *omme*, now written *homme* in French, from the Latin *homo*.

Some of these, as we have seen, are only the determinatives used separately from the substantives, and filling the office of pronouns by ellipsis, as the French articles *le*, *la*, *les*, for instance, which stand elliptically for the objective form of personal pronouns. But, although in

these two functions they similarly determine the extent of signification of the substantives to which they relate, they should not be confounded. The very absence of the nouns to which such words refer only proves that they are pronouns. The rule for distinguishing one species from the other is this: The genuine pronoun always stands by itself, and represents a noun not named, whereas the genuine determinative always accompanies its noun, and never appears without it.

Adverbs

The name ADVERB is given to words which serve to modify the meaning of adjectives, of other adverbs, and more especially of verbs, from which they take their name. The adverb is an abbreviated mode of expression, and seems originally to have been contrived to express compendiously in one word what must otherwise have required two or more. Thus, *often* means “many times”; *when*, “at what time”; *why*, “for what reason”; *here*, “in this place”; *away*, “at a distance”; *thus*, “in this wise,” etc. Every adverb is generally equivalent to a preposition and its complement; and, therefore, when a language has not a word corresponding to an adverb in another language, it can always express it in that compound way. Thus, the French adverb *difficilement* is rendered in English by *with difficulty*, and the English *leisurely* into French by *à loisir*.

Single-worded adverbs vary in number in different languages; those of manner are the most numerous, being formed almost all from adjectives by the addition of an affix which implies the idea of manner, likeness, similarity. Thus, the word *truly* means “in truth; according to truth,” the same as *vraiment* in French, and *veramente* in Italian, in which *ment* and *mente*, from the Latin *mens*, have a similar meaning. Many substantives also in English, by taking *ly* or *like*, contribute to the formation of a particular class of adverbs, as *hourly*, *yearly*, *instantly*, *purposefully*, etc. In Latin, the terminations *e* and *er* are the most common characteristic syllables of the adverbs of manner. In Greek, all proper names of places become adverbs by changes of the final syllables.

From the nature of the adverb it may be seen why the French word *en*, “of it”; *y*, “to it”; *où*, “in which”; *d’où*, “from which,” being the equivalents of prepositions and pronouns, may be considered either as pronouns in the oblique case, or as adverbs; and why, also, the ablative

absolute and the supines of Latin verbs are species of adverbs. The adverbs *why*, *when*, *whence*, *where*, *wherefore*, are undoubtedly different oblique cases of the pronoun *which*.

Negatives are also adverbial expressions denoting, like other adverbs, particular circumstances of time, place, quantity, manner, etc., but in a negative sense. Hence we find them in some languages composed of two terms, one of which is the negative proper, and the other its complement, signifying the circumstance which modifies it with relation to time, place, quantity, manner, etc., and which is itself an affirmative expression. For example, in *ne...pas*, *ne...point*, *pas* means originally “pace,” and *point*, “point”; and as a point is less than a pace, so is *ne point* a stronger negative than *ne pas*. The notion, therefore, that the French requires two negatives to express a negation, as we find it sometimes stated, is altogether erroneous. In that language, as well as in English, two negatives make an affirmative.^[59] It is in Greek only that two negatives sometimes enforce instead of destroying each other. In English, the two terms which constitute the negative are generally united in one word; thus, “not ever” becomes *never*; “no thing,” *nothing*; “no one,” *none*, etc. In French the terms remain separate, *ne* being placed before the verb, and its complement after. It is by ellipsis that the second term is sometimes used as a negative. This happens when the verb is understood, and with it the first term, as: *l’aimez-vous*? “do you like him, her, or it?” *pas beaucoup*, “not much”—that is, *je ne l’aime pas beaucoup*.

There are as many adverbs as there are modes of being that can be expressed by a preposition and its complement. Single-worded and idiomatic adverbs, with the exception of the adverbs of manner, are in all languages very limited in number, but of frequent recurrence. Some refer to time, as, *now*, *sometimes*, *often*, *formerly*, *lately*; others to place, *here*, *there*, *elsewhere*; quantity, *little*, *much*, *more*; quality, *ardently*, *wisely*, *knowingly*; manner, *well*, *ill*, *promptly*, *slowly*, *swiftly*, *elegantly*; interrogation, *why?* *what for?* affirmation, *yes*, *truly*, *certainly*; negation, *no*, *in no way*, *not at all*; diminution, *almost*, *nearly*; doubt, *possibly*, *perhaps*; exception, *only*, *merely*, *singly*; resemblance, *as*, *like*, *likewise*; diversity, *differently*, *variously*, *otherwise*; addition, *together*, *in the same breath*; division, *separately*, *severally*, *distinctly*, *apart from others*; distance, *hence*, *whence*, *away*; argument, *of course*, *consequently*, *therefore*, etc. Most of these can be expressed by a prepo-

sition and a noun or pronoun, each of which may, by an omission of the other, become accidentally an adverb, as: *I went and he stayed behind*, that is, *behind me*; *he stayed an hour*, that is, *during an hour*—the preposition in the first sentence and the noun in the second being adverbs by ellipsis.

Adverbs, being attributive terms, take for the most part the same degrees of comparison, and form them in the same way as adjectives, when these admit of them. From the similarity of nature in these two parts of speech, it also frequently happens that a proposition and its complement may be either an adjectival or an adverbial phrase, according as it modifies a substantive or a verb; as in French, *un homme à la mode*, “a fashionable man”; *un terrain de niveau*, “a leveled ground”; *il s’habille à la mode*, “he dresses fashionably”; *il les met de niveau*, “he puts them on a level.” In the first two examples, *à la mode* and *de niveau* are adjectival phrases; in the other two they are adverbial.

Sometimes an adverb and an adjective are equally applicable to a verb, but with a difference of meaning. *I found the way easy* means that I walked over it, and found it to be an *easy way*; *I found the way easily* would mean that I had no difficulty in finding it out, and seeing how it lay. When Shakespeare says, *Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown*, he gives expression to an undisputed truth that a king, worthy of the name, is so weighed down by a sense of the responsibility attached to his office, that he can scarcely sleep. But if he had said, *Uneasily lies the head that wears a crown*, he would have suggested the ludicrous idea that a crown makes a very bad night-cap. We sometimes hear people in their prayers thank God that *He has brought them safely to the beginning of a new day*, as if the mode of bringing them over was referred to. They mean surely to thank God for having brought *them safe*; but then they should say so. This error of using the adverb when the adjective should be employed is by no means uncommon, and is based on a rule, found in many grammars, that we must always qualify a verb by the adverbial form, and never by the adjectival. According to this rule, such expressions as *The moon shines bright*; *the rose smells sweet*; *you look sad*, are wrong, and ought to have been written *brightly*, *sweetly*, *sadly*. But this is a mistake. There may be two uses of an adverb as qualifying a verb. One of these may have respect to the action indicated by the verb, describing the mode of performance;

the other may have respect to the result of that action, irrespective of its mode of performance. Thus, we must say *the moon shines bright*, and not *brightly*, for it is plain that the qualifying word *bright* refers not to the mode in which the moon performs her function of shining, but to the result or product of that shining; that is, the moon is giving light, and that light is *bright*. The distinction thus made between what may be called the subjective and the objective use of a verb will at once point out the error of such expressions as “looking sadly,” “smelling sweetly,” “feeling queerly,” and the like, for in all these we do not mean to qualify the mode of acting or being, but to describe the result produced by the act or state. *To smell sweetly* is not meant to describe some sweet way of performing the act of smelling, but is meant to describe that the smell itself is *sweet*. In this case the verb “to smell” has no reference to the faculty of perceiving by the organs of the nose certain qualities of bodies, but to the power of emitting odors possessed by certain bodies. *The rose smells sweet* is, therefore, equivalent to saying *the odor of the rose is sweet*, and no other word than an adjective could convey the idea of its sweetness. If I were told that *Miss Brown looked beautifully* last night, I might wonder what she was looking at, and in what way she did it; but if I heard that *she looked beautiful*, I might regret not having seen her on that occasion — *beautifully* applying to the act of looking *with* the eye; *beautiful* to the fact of appearing *to* the eye.

The adverb is to the verb what the adjective is to the noun; the former serves to modify the signification of the verb, the latter that of the noun; and in the same way as the adjective indicates an additional quality or mode of being in the noun, so the adverb denotes a particular mode of action which the verb has left partly undetermined. Thus the adverb expresses a permanent modification which, by imparting a special sense to the verb, is thoroughly blended therewith, extending over the entire duration of its action, whereas the adverbial phrase expresses merely an accidental circumstance affecting the verb for a special purpose only. The adverbial phrase may be said to express a transient influence; the adverb a permanent one—the former applying to actions that are casual and accidental, the latter to those that are habitual and constant. This distinction, which is but seldom made in English, is carefully observed in French.^[60]

The position of the adverb varies considerably in different languages, and in any particular language the position of certain adverbs is sometimes well defined, though more generally determined by circumstance. Though no definite rule can be laid down for the position of adverbs and adverbial phrases in general, yet it is a matter of the greatest importance, so far as precision is concerned, to take care that they be rightly placed, ambiguity being often produced by misplacing them in such a manner as to make them apply equally to the word or clause going before or that coming after. There is, perhaps, no word so often found misplaced, even in the works of distinguished authors, [61] and none more so than the word *only* and its correlative *alone*, the wrong placing of which in a sentence is apt to alter its meaning entirely. Take the following sentence, for instance: *The negroes are to appear at church only in boots*. By this position of *only*, it appears that the negroes were not to come to church unless in boots, or with nothing else but boots; whereas the meaning intended was that they should appear at church, and nowhere else, in boots. The sentence should, therefore, have stood thus: *The negroes are to appear only at church in boots*. [62] Again: *Man is always capable of laughing* means that the risible faculty may at any time be excited; but if we rearrange the same words differently, and say: *Man is capable of laughing always*, we should mean that, if he wanted to, he could do it forever. The attempt to lay down rules for the position of the adverb in cases of this kind is generally futile; the only practical rule is this: "Adverbs must be placed so as to leave no doubt what word is intended to be affected by them."

Prepositions

A **PREPOSITION** is a word that connects two words together in such a manner as to indicate the relation which the things, or ideas signified by them, bear to each other.

A relation always implies two terms, between which is usually placed the preposition which connects them. The one preceding the preposition has been called its *antecedent*, the one that follows its *complement*, because it completes the idea of relation expressed by that preposition.

Sometimes a relation is indicated by the place alone which the words occupy in the sentence, as that, for instance, between a transitive verb and its direct object. Thus, in *James resembles his brother*, the relation between *resembles* and its direct object *brother* is clearly expressed by the latter being placed after the verb; but in French the corresponding verb *ressembler* is neuter, which, not having a direct object, requires a preposition to reach it, as, *Jacques ressemble à son frère*. Prepositions, then, are necessary when relation can not be indicated by relative position alone.

In some languages the most common relations are indicated by inflections; but, in general, and especially in modern idioms, all such conceptions of the mind are expressed by prepositions. Thus: "Moses gave the law of God to the Jewish people" would be expressed in French by *Moïse donna la loi de Dieu au peuple juif*, but in Latin by *Moses dedit legem Dei populo judaico*. Each of these relations has its exponent, but this exponent is not, like in English and in French, a separate word; it is, in the first, the final syllable *em* of the word *legem*; in the second, the final *i* of the word *Dei*; and, in the third, the final *o* of the words *populo judaico*. These terminations are called *cases*. Other relations, less common than these, are also expressed by cases, but then they are more distinctly specified by appropriate prepositions.

Thus, in *eo ad urbem*, “I got to the city,” and *venio ab urbe*, “I come from the city,” the nature of the relation which is between *eo*, “I go,” and *urbe*, “the city,” is determined both by the preposition *ad*, “to,” and the termination *em* of the word *urbem*; and that which exists between *venio*, “I come,” and the same noun, by the preposition *ab*, “from,” and the termination *e* of the word *urbe*.

Considered by themselves alone, prepositions are only general and undetermined signs of relations, independently of any antecedent or complement. Still, no preposition finds a place in the sentence without applying to some antecedent, the sense of which it restricts by the idea of which it is the sign, and without being followed by a complement which specifies the relation that is indicated in a vague and undetermined manner by the preposition.

The words that can be antecedents of prepositions are: 1. Nouns, as: “What is the *matter with* your brother”; “He has an *opportunity of* displaying his talents”; “He has no *taste for* music.” 2. Adjectives, as: “A parent *anxious about* the welfare of his child”; “Happiness is not *consistent with* wickedness”; “He is *equal to* any emergency.” 3. Verbs, as: “The schoolmaster is abroad, and I *trust to* him”; “Montague was *rewarded by* the king, *for* his services, *with* the place of chancellor”; “The style of Johnson *abounds in* words of foreign origin.” 4. Adverbs, as: “The Latin cities to which the Latins sent colonists *equally with* the Romans”; “I have heard of a work of a foreign officer who took a survey of the European armies *previously to* the Revolutionary War.” In the same way, every preposition has necessarily for complement either a noun—as, “He is fond *of money*”; “They admitted him *into college*”—or a pronoun, as, “Be not angry *with me*”; “I called *on him* this morning ”—or a verb, as, “I am anxious *to see* you”; “I am not ambitious *of seeing* the ceremony.” A verb thus used after a preposition is used substantively. In English it can be either the present participle or the present infinitive; in Latin, French, Italian, Spanish, and German, it is always the latter. The particle *to*, which is the sign of the English present infinitive, must not be confounded with the preposition *to*; the former always disappears when the latter is used, meaning *in order to*, as: *I came to see you; I did that to please you*, and the like. The sign *to* is also omitted after the following verbs: *Bid, can, care, dare, do, feel, hear, let, make, may, must, need, shall, will, see, behold*, and is beginning to be omitted after several others,

particularly after verbs that are synonymous with *to see*, such as *perceive*, *observe*, etc. In some cases it is a difference of meaning which determines the omission or retention of *to*, as: *I dare do all that may become a man*, and *I dare you to do it*; in the first example, *dare* has the sense of *having courage*; in the second it means *to challenge*, *to defy*, which reach their complement by the preposition *to*.

The true place of a preposition being between its antecedent and its complement, it is only by inversion that it can be placed sometimes at the head of a sentence. Thus, *By patience and perseverance the work will be completed* is an inverted construction, the object of which is to emphasize the words *patience* and *perseverance*; its logical order is: "The work will be *completed by* patience and perseverance." In the same way, *In my Father's house are many mansions* is equivalent to "there are many mansions in my Father's house," which is its logical construction. From this it will be observed that prepositions and their complements form, in many instances, adverbial phrases answering the questions *why?* *where?* *whence?* in the same way as adjectives in one language frequently take the prepositional form in another. Thus, "a glass bottle" is in French *une bouteille de verre*; "an ink-bottle," *une bouteille à encre*.

In a great number of languages the relation between two nouns is indicated by placing the complement immediately before the antecedent, with which it forms, as it were, a single word, as "flower-pot," in French *pot à fleurs*; "sea-side," *bord de la mer*; and such a relation may even be expressed by several nouns placed in succession, as "Indian church altar ornaments," for instance, which in French would be rendered by *ornaments des autels des églises des Indes*. In cases like these the terms *antecedent* and *complement*, or *consequent*, as the latter is sometimes called, seem to be in contradiction with the order of the words in the sentence, but they are not so in reference to the order of the ideas. Thus, in the latter example, it is the idea of *ornaments* which presents itself first to the mind, and is modified by that of *altar*, which in turn is modified by the idea of *church*, as the latter is modified by that of *Indian*.

The number of single-worded prepositions amounts to about forty-five in Latin and German, forty-four in French, forty-two in English, thirty-three in Italian, eighteen in Greek, and only sixteen in Spanish; they do not much exceed the highest of these numbers in any

language. Relations for which there are particular words in one idiom may always be expressed in another by prepositional phrases formed of adverbs or adverbial phrases and a single preposition; so, the Latin *præ* is rendered in English by *comparatively with*, and in French by *en comparaison de*; the French for *above* is *au-dessus de*; the English for *moyennant* is *by means of*, *by the help of*.

In some languages, as Greek, Latin, and German, prepositions vary in their government, being followed by different cases; but in modern idioms they govern their complements as direct objects, with the exception of the French *à* and *de*, corresponding generally to the English *to* and *of*, the latter being in many instances expressed by the possessive case in preference. The reason of prepositions in modern languages usually governing their complements as direct objects is owing to their being mostly derived from active verbs, which origin can be easily traced in a few, as *except*, *save*, *touching*, *considering*, *concerning*, *respecting*. This origin, however, escapes observation in most of them, in consequence of the many changes and contractions which they have undergone in the course of time, and in passing from one language into another.

The relations which the objects of thought bear to each other, considered apart from these objects, are, perhaps, the most abstract notions which can be conceived, and hence the reason why such relations were originally marked by modifications in the noun before words were instituted for that purpose.^[63] The difficulty of determining in a definite manner the exact comprehension of such words has introduced much confusion in their application. It would be impossible to tell all that is included under the most familiar prepositions. In all languages the same prepositions often serve to express various and even opposite relations, and the same relations are frequently expressed by different prepositions. Thus, in English we say “*at the hour*”; “*on the day*”; “*in the year*”; and in French, *être dans le royaume*; *être en Italie*; *être à Rome*. Again, “*to listen to*” is in French *écouter*, and “*to think of*” *penser à*. *Salle à manger* means “*dining-room*”; *maison à louer*, “*house to let*”; and *maison à vendre*, “*house for sale*.” *Etre à pied*, *à cheval*, is “*to be on foot*, *on horseback*”; *recevoir quelqu’un à bras ouverts* is “*to receive one with open arms*.” *Le palais du roi* is “*the king’s palace*,” but *les mouvements du corps*, “*the movements of the body*.” “*To snatch one from death*” is *arracher quelqu’un à la mort*, and “*to*

drink *out of* a glass” is in French *boire dans un verre*. The dissimilarity which exists in the mode of using this part of speech in different languages presents to foreigners a perplexity which nothing but persevering practice can overcome.

A rule, however, which is common to all languages is this, that in every case the preposition must be suggested by its antecedent, as: “Every new institution should be but a fuller *development of*, or an *addition to*, what already exists.” “The citizens of one country could neither *intermarry with*, nor *inherit* nor *purchase* land *from*, those of any other.” *Inherit* happens to take the same preposition after it as *purchase*, else it would have required a different one immediately after it also—all applying to the same complement, *those of any other*. The French is even more strict, and requires that in such a case all prepositions shall govern their complement in the same manner, or else that, after every preposition, its complement shall be repeated or represented by a pronoun. Thus, *un homme qui écrit, selon les circonstances pour et contre un parti, est un homme bien méprisable*, is correct, because *pour* and *contre* govern their complement both as their direct object—that is, we can say equally well *pour un parti* as *contre un parti*; but we can not say *celui qui écrit en faveur et contre un parti*, because *en faveur* needs to be followed by the preposition *de*, whereas *contre* does not need any.^[64]

The name *preposition*, given to this part of speech from the accidental fact of its being placed before its complement, is apt to lead to misapprehension as regards its nature. In many instances it is even incorrect, as in certain Oriental idioms it comes always after its complement, and in Latin,^[65] Greek,^[66] and German,^[67] it occasionally also occupies this place. Instances of thus placing the preposition are quite numerous in English, as: *hats off*; *hands off*; *he is well or ill off*; *they cut his head off*; *he is an ugly fellow to deal with*; *he is never to be depended upon*; *this is a good rule to go by*; *the thing is not to be thought of*; *this is a good place to live in*; *he has nothing to live for*; *he has no one to go to*, and the like. It is more particularly when the object is a relative or interrogative pronoun that in English the preposition is thrown to the end, as: *What are we coming to?* *What are you talking about?* *I know what you are after.* *What will you sell that horse for?* *Whom do you speak to?* *Whom do you ask for?* *Whom did you give it to?* etc. And so with interrogative constructions in general. *Whence come you?* is

grammatically correct, but no one would ever say so. The only way of putting that inquiry is, *Where do you come from? Where are you going to?* is also the usual mode of asking the question, although the preposition is here not absolutely necessary, this adverb of rest, *where*, being used in the sense of the adverb of motion, *whither*. The question, *Were you going to do it?* is likewise in conversational style properly answered by *I was going to*, or *I was not going to*, as the case may be, leaving *do it* out by ellipsis. This kind of colloquial abbreviation comprehends several more phrases in common use, such as *ought to*, *want to*, *neglect to*, *object to*, and the like—some of them not very elegant, but all quite unobjectionable on the score of grammar. In some cases there is a choice whether the preposition shall precede or follow its complement, and it is then generally determined by considerations of euphony. Thus, we may say: *The man to whom I had written*, or *the man I had written to*. In this particular instance the former term, if not more correct, would probably be more usually employed, but in many others an inversion would be better liked. Thus: *You are the man I wanted to have some talk with*, would be most always said; *You are the man with whom I wanted to have some talk*, seldom. These sentences, it is true, are colloquial, but not the less good English, and show that the usual definition of the preposition as “a word placed before a noun or pronoun to show its relation to some other word of the sentence,” is incorrect, and the name itself a misnomer, as it neither expresses the nature of the word, nor indicates the place it occupies in the sentence.

Conjunctions

The different parts of speech thus far considered—verbs, nouns, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions—all enter into the formation of propositions, showing the relations that exist between their component parts; in like manner propositions may be related to each other in various ways, the nature of which needs also to be indicated by distinct and appropriate signs.

Sometimes a proposition stands in contrast with a preceding clause; at other times it depends upon the one that follows as a necessary condition; and then again it requires a second proposition to develop its meaning fully. *Make haste, or you will miss the train; I know it, and I can prove it; You may say so, but I know better; I will call this evening, if you are disengaged; She is persuaded that every one admires her, though she is rather homely,* are sentences composed of two or more propositions which, though complete in themselves, express their relations and mutual dependence only by means of the words *or, and, but, if, that, and though*, which link them together, and hence are called *conjunctions*.

Not only do conjunctions serve to connect clauses and sentences, but even two or more propositions may often by their aid be condensed into one, as: *Honor thy father and thy mother; He or I must go; Be neither a miser nor a spendthrift*, each of which can be resolved into two clauses: *Honor thy father and honor thy mother; He must go or I must go; Be not a miser and be not a spendthrift*.

Like prepositions, so conjunctions are primarily adverbs used in a demonstrative and relative sense. Hence most of the conjunctions are worn and petrified *cases* of pronouns. The relation between two propositions was originally expressed by simply setting them side by side; afterward, by employing a demonstrative at the beginning of the second clause, to refer to the whole preceding one. The relative pro-

noun can be shown to have been in the first instance a demonstrative; indeed, we can still use *that* in English in a relative sense. Since the demonstrative at the beginning of the second clause represented the first clause, and was, consequently, an attribute of the second, it had to stand in some case, and in course of time the case became a conjunction. How closely allied the adverb and the conjunction are may be seen from Greek and Latin, where *ὥς* or *quum* can be used as either the one or the other. The English *and*, it may here be observed, has probably the same root as the Greek *ἔτι*, and originally signified “going further.”

In the same way as the number of prepositions in any language is inadequate to express all relations that can exist between words, so the number of single-worded conjunctions is insufficient to express all relations that may exist between different propositions; the deficiency, however, is easily supplied by conjunctive phrases formed with verbs, prepositions, or adverbs, as, *so that; suppose that; except that; for fear that; as soon as; as long as; as much as; instead of; for want of; this is why*, etc. In fact, conjunctions, like most other relational words, are elliptical and contracted phrases, an origin so obvious in some of them, that they may with equal propriety be called words or phrases.

For logical purposes, and as far as reasoning is concerned, no part of speech is of more consequence than the one under consideration. Different from prepositions, the meaning of conjunctions is generally well defined, and seldom fails to indicate, in a clear and distinct manner, the nature of the relation that exists between the clauses which they join together. An exception to this is the conjunction *and*, which in its frequent recurrence is sometimes connective, at other times cumulative, then again redundant, and often without meaning. For instance, *God spoke, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast*. Here are four propositions, forming each a perfect sense, and coupled in pairs by the conjunction *and*, the office of which in the one pair is to indicate that the creation of all things was the consequence of a word of God; and in the other, that the effect expressed in the second clause was the result of God’s command. Speaking of the cheapness of Bibles at the present day, a writer says: *The only revelation of God’s will to mankind, and the only record of God’s dealings with men, is now to be obtained for a sum which a laboring man might save out of one day’s*

wages. Here one thing, and not two, is the subject of the sentence. If *and* were used as a connective for the purpose of superadding a second clause to the first, the verb would be in the plural, and the sentence would convey the idea that the writer was speaking of two books—one containing the only revelation of God's will, and the other the only record of his dealings; but this is not the meaning, and the real subject of the verb *is* is to be found in the words that are omitted, and which, being reproduced, would make the sentence read: *That book, which is the only revelation, etc.* The ellipsis is often much disguised, and apt to mislead by two or more of its complements appearing as a complex subject; the mistake is, however, easily corrected when the verb is in the singular, as in the following examples from the French, in which the form of the verb directly points to the subject prefacing each sentence: *Aimer Dieu et vivre suivant ses passions, c'est une chimère*; that is: *L'action de—Aimer Dieu, etc.* *Ne craindre ni Dieu ni les hommes, ni le témoignage de sa conscience, c'est le caractère d'un scélérat qui doit être proscrit de la société.*

In mentioning persons or things, and for the purpose of enumeration in general, *and* is usually placed before the last term named, as: *two, four, and six* are even numbers. It has here evidently no meaning, and is only an expletive. The same idiomatic use of *and* occurs in counting, as: *two and four and six is twelve*. Here *and* has the meaning of the sign (+) set between numbers and quantities, signifying that they are to be added together, and with this meaning it is difficult to call it a conjunction. The sentence, *John and James went to town*, may be resolved into two clauses, *John went to town* and *James went to town*, which may have been at the same time or at different times; it is only by an adverb, and not by the conjunction, that it can be specified whether they went *separately* or *together*. *John and James carried a basket* seems to indicate that they did it conjointly, but only by inference, as in the case of many articles being removed, such as one trunk, one valise, and two baskets. I might say that *Patrick carried the trunk, William the valise, John and James a basket*, which would indicate that *John carried one basket* and *James the other*. The case would be somewhat different if, instead of *a basket*, I had said *the basket*; but, even then, if the basket happened to be a heavy one, John and James might have carried it alternately, instead of conjointly. The fact is, it is only predicated that *John carried* and that *James carried*; but what they

carried, and the manner in which they carried it, must be expressed by a noun and some appropriate adverb, if ambiguity is to be avoided. Often, however, this is not necessary, and even not desirable, when the context, usage, or good common sense readily supplies the words that are omitted. This is especially the case in scientific formulas and general expressions for resolving problems, as, for instance, *Let A B and B C and C D form a triangle*, which evidently means, “Let A B, B C, and C D be so placed as to form a triangle”—the words omitted being so clearly understood, that to every mind it is the letters that indicate the combination, and not the words *and*, which are mere signs of enumeration, and which could be perfectly dispensed with, as they are in many languages,^[68] without altering the meaning of the sentence. When I say, *The wheel and axle is a mechanic power*, the very use of the verb *is* in the singular shows my mind not to view the wheel and the axle separately, but as a combination, designated by a single word in French, *le treuil*.^[69]

Though sentences like these may not be logically correct, it would be idle, even in the sense of grammar, to criticise expressions that have been sanctioned by usage, for it is evident that the grammatical correctness or incorrectness of an expression depends upon its intelligibility, that is to say, upon the ordinary use and custom of a particular language. Whatever is so unfamiliar as not to be generally understood is ungrammatical; in other words, it is contrary to the habits of a language as determined by usage and common consent. Viewed in this way, we can explain how it happens that the grammar of a cultivated idiom so frequently disagrees with that of another. Thus, for instance, the French word *ou* may be placed before as many alternatives as there are in the sentence; in English, according to some grammarians, the corresponding word *or* can refer to one alternative only; yet we read in a distinguished writer: *Either the words were idiomatic, or were not intelligible, or were not needed, or looked ill, or sounded ill, or some other valid reason existed against them*.^[70] The negative *ni* in French may be repeated before as many words as depend upon the same negation; in English, its corresponding *neither*, *nor*, were originally dual words, but are now freely extended to three and even more alternatives, as: *Logic neither observes, nor invents, nor discovers, but proves. The rector was neither laborious, nor obliviously self-denying, nor yet very copious in alms-giving*.^[71] It will be observed that, while all lexicographers

agree in defining *either* as “one or the other,” and *neither* as “not the one or the other,” yet the repetition of their correlatives *or* and *nor* to introduce two or more co-ordinate clauses, though perhaps a Gallicism, allows them to be expressed with an emphasis that could not well be obtained by any other arrangement of the sentence.

The usual definition of the conjunction as a word which connects sentences and parts of sentences to indicate their relation and mutual dependence, falls short of precision in the case of the conjunction *that*, which indicates not merely a junction of two ideas, or a simple relation of dependence, but an intimate union of two ideas, one of which is always the indispensable complement of the other. Thus: *I believe that the soul is immortal; I doubt that one can be happy without being virtuous; I observed that you did not speak to him; I hope that you may succeed.* In each of these sentences the verb demands a complement expressing *something*, which, being developed into a regular clause, is linked to the leading clause by the word *that*. But even as the relation between propositions was originally expressed by mere juxtaposition, so this conjunction, which is always expressed in French, is often omitted in English, as with a few verbs also in German. *I hope that you may succeed; I wish that you may get it; I know that you are right,* are expressions equally correct with or without the conjunction. And not only are complementary ideas often expressed in English without this conjunction and the verb in a personal mood, but sometimes also with the verb in the infinitive, as: *I believe him to be honest; What do you want me to do? I want you to be just;* the same as in Latin: *Volo vos esse justos. Credo Deum esse omnipotentem,* and the like.

No word is a conjunction without an antecedent, whether expressed or understood; for to link, join, or couple affirmations, two terms at least are necessary. If, therefore, a conjunction commences a sentence, it is by inversion, which is sometimes resorted to for the purpose of placing emphasis on the depending clause, as: *If he is guilty, his punishment will be severe. Since it rains, I will have to stay at home.* To express these clauses in regular order would certainly be very feeble. When a sentence is composed of two propositions joined by a conjunction, harmony has often much to do with their relative position, especially in French, which generally requires the shorter clause to be placed first, as: *Lorsqu'on est honnête homme, on a bien de la peine à soupçonner les autres de ne l'être pas. Puisque la nature se contente de*

peu, à quoi bon une table servie avec somptuosité et profusion? It will require but little taste or literary discrimination to see at once the inadequacy of the following regular construction: *On a bien de la peine à soupçonner son semblable de n'être pas honnête homme, lorsqu'on l'est soi-même. A quoi bon une table servie avec somptuosité et profusion, puisque la nature se contente de peu?* In English, the conjunctions *when, while, whereas, since, unless, before, after*, and a few others, often commence, on the same ground, the sentence by inversion. *And, but, for, thus*, are found sometimes at the head of the sentence without any apparent correlative clause, but then the substance of such a clause is found in the previous sentence, which is tacitly referred to by the writer or speaker to render more forcible the words that follow.

The government of conjunctions is, in the study of a language, a source of much perplexity, which the rules given in grammar are not always able to remove. In most languages the rule is that they govern the subjunctive or the indicative, according as they imply contingency or not, which would be easy enough if the distinction were always clear; but it is not, and the shades of difference are sometimes so delicate as to escape the writer's attention. Even in English, where the use of the subjunctive is well-nigh dispensed with entirely, and observed only with the conjunctions *if* and *whether*, considerable uncertainty often prevails as regards their import. Here, however, the general rule is plain enough, that when matter of *fact* is concerned, we should use the indicative; when matter of *doubt*, the subjunctive. *Whether I be master or you, one thing is plain*, indicates uncertainty as to which is master; *You shall soon see whether I am master, or you*, leaves no doubt as to the fact, at least not in the mind of the speaker. The following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is recommended as useful: "Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases: (1) *as is the case*; (2) *as may or may not be the case*. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows. When the first formula is the one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. *If (as is the case) he is gone, I must follow him*. When the second formula is the one required, there is an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. *If (as may or may not be the case) he be gone, I must follow him*."^[72] This rule, which is good for

English, in no way applies to any other idiom, for the government of conjunctions varies not only for the different conjunctions of one language, but for the corresponding conjunctions in different languages. “*When you come to-morrow,*” in which *when* governs the present indicative in English, has for corresponding conjunction *quand* governing the future tense in French: *Quand vous viendrez demain*. In “*If he should come,*” the English conditional has for corresponding tense the imperfect of the indicative in French, *s’il venait*, “*Before you came,*” indicative in English, is rendered by, *Avant que vous vinssiez*, with the verb in the subjunctive mood, in French.

Prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions having, in many instances, a common origin, and being often converted one into the other, are easily confounded. To discriminate correctly between these three species of words, we must bear in mind that prepositions have always for their complements *nouns*, *pronouns*, and *verbs* in the infinitive mood when used substantively; whereas adverbs generally follow, and conjunctions precede *verbs* when used as such. Thus, in the following sentences: “He went out *before* me,” *Il sortit avant moi*, “before” and *avant* are prepositions. In “He went out *before* I saw him,” *Il sortit avant que je le visse*, “before” is a conjunction, and *avant que* a conjunctive phrase. In “He went out *before*,” *Il sortit auparavant*, “before” and *auparavant* are adverbs. Prepositions govern personal pronouns only as their *objects*; but conjunctions are followed by personal pronouns as *subjects*, as: “Have a fire *for me*, *for* I am cold,” *Ayez du feu pour moi, car j’ai froid*.

Furthermore, adverbs, different from prepositions, do not connect words, nor do they connect propositions like conjunctions. They mark no relations between substantives or sentences, but modify the import of verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, and can always be changed into phrases formed of a preposition with its complement, which is not the case with prepositions and conjunctions. Prepositions require nouns or pronouns, and conjunctions require verbs, to complete the ideas of relation which they express; whereas adverbs have no complement, but serve themselves to complete or modify the idea expressed by the verb. Verbs can not be used interrogatively with their governing conjunctions; but they may be used so with the adverbs which complete or modify their meaning.

To complete the distinction between adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, we may add that prepositions are to substantives what conjunctions are to verbs, and that adverbs are to verbs, adjectives, and adverbs what adjectives are to nouns.

Interjections

It is only to conform to common practice that we place this class of words among the parts of speech, since they should be considered rather as vague sounds than as distinct, definite words. They are naturally indicative, not conventionally representative, of emotions. They have not the fixity of real words; for they vary in intonation and quantity with every emotion that gives them birth. They follow not the laws of language, but those of nature; they are, like the other signs of language of action, common to all languages and intelligible to all men. The neighing of a horse, the lowing of a cow, the barking of a dog, the purring of a cat, sneezing, coughing, groaning, shrieking, and any other involuntary convulsion with oral sound, have almost as good a title to be called parts of speech as interjections have. The person who uses interjections uses them as he would a gesture—to express surprise, pain, joy, contempt, or any other emotion; but, although he uses them thus, he makes no *affirmation*. He no more affirms that he is surprised, or that he is in pain, or that he is scornful or happy, than if he started back, wrung his hands in agony, smiled, or curled his lip contemptuously. In like manner the hearer understands his meaning, but he would have understood the gesture as well. Nothing is affirmed or denied by this class of words, if words they can be called; neither do they enter into propositions wherein anything is affirmed or denied. They never affect the grammatical structure of a sentence, and are wholly independent of propositions, as much so as the hiss of a snake or the roar of a lion—expressions of which we infer the meaning, but expressions as to the meaning whereof we are not informed in the way we are informed by propositions. These remarks, of course, apply to what are called interjections proper, such as, *ah! aha! eh! oh! ho! lo! alas!* etc.; the words, *help! fire! dear me! strange! welcome! adieu!* and

the like, often used like interjections, properly belong to other parts of speech.

Conclusion

After carefully perusing these pages, which are addressed to his reason and not to his memory, the student should, in reviewing them, test his understanding of the principles unfolded by illustrations and examples made by himself, and to the extent of his ability, in any language he happens to be acquainted with. By adhering to this advice, he will to a remarkable degree develop his powers of observation and criticism, which will enable him not only to perceive more distinctly what he should learn to understand and imitate, but also to sum up correctly the result of his investigations. If, for instance, a number of individual expressions be presented in which the same peculiarity of arrangement prevails, he will be struck by the resemblance, readily imitate that peculiarity of arrangement when required to construct other sentences of the same sort, and easily of himself infer the rule which governs them all. This analytical mode of studying grammar, similar to the intellectual process by which we arrive at a knowledge of all natural laws, is the most rational and the most favorable to mental discipline; it consists in observing facts, comparing them, remarking their resemblances and differences, and afterward bringing into the same class all similar facts. Those which may be generalized constitute the *rules*, and those which are not comprised within any class form the *exceptions*. Thus observation, comparison, and generalization are the essential means of arriving at the knowledge of any particular grammar. It is by this inductive process that all grammars have been made.

Endnotes

[1] Common opinion attributes the diversity of languages to the
p. 12 occurrences at Babel. But as commentators do not agree in
the explanation of the Scripture passages which bear on the
subject, we offer the following for consideration: In Gen. x, 25, 81,
82, we read that Noah portioned out the world among his posterity ac-
cording to their tongues, families, and nations; which procedure im-
plies that a diversity of languages was already established. It seems,
then, that the subsequent facts concerning the confusion of tongues,
related afterward in Gen. xi, did not affect the whole human race, but
concerned only that portion of mankind who were especially distin-
guished by the title “sons of men” (Gen. xi, 5). This phrase, moreover,
occurs already in Gen. vi, 2, with a similar meaning, and there can
be no good reason for supposing that it is used again so soon after-
ward in a completely different sense. The only objection that can be
raised against this view of the subject lies in the strong expression,
“The whole earth was of one language and of one speech” (Gen. xi,
1); but this phrase has been thoroughly discussed in the account of
the flood, as connected with geology. While most theologians agree
that the deluge was universal in regard to man, there are several who
argue, even from the terms of Scripture, that the flood was only a
local catastrophe in respect to the whole globe. It is remarked that
the word ארץ, besides its extensive meaning of “the earth,” is often
used in the more limited sense of “land,” “country,” such as “the
land of Canaan,” “the land of Egypt.” Thus we read in Gen. xli,
54, 56, 57, that “the dearth was in all lands; and the famine was
over all the face of the earth; and all countries came to Egypt to
buy corn, because the famine was sore in all lands”; while it is evi-
dent, from the nature of the case, and the application to Egypt for
food, that it must have been partial. In the New Testament we meet

with the expression, “There was darkness over the whole earth” (Mark xv, 33). Many other instances may be quoted where language equally general in its form is used in a very limited sense, but in the history of Babel the sense of the words is much more clearly defined than in the other passages quoted; for the ambiguous phrase which may signify either “the whole earth” or “all the land” is here determined to the more limited meaning by the other specific phrase “the sons of men,” pointed to in Gen. xi, 2, as a people “migrated from the East,” and then engaged in building the city and tower of Babel.

[2] William Whewell, “History of the Inductive Sciences.”
p. 15

[3] The author of a book entitled “De vet. lit. Hun. Scyth.,”
p. 17 p. 15, mentions certain innkeepers in Hungary who used hieroglyphic representations, not only to keep their accounts, but to describe their debtors; so that if one was a *soldier*, they drew a rude kind of *sword*; for a *smith* or *carpenter*, a *hammer* or an *axe*; for a *carter*, a *whip*, etc. The like is by no means uncommon all the world over.

[4] Ipsa gens Phœnicum in gloria magna literarum inventionis et
p. 23 siderum, navaliumque ac bellicarum artium. (Plinius, “Nat. Hist.,” lib. v, cap. 12.)

Si famæ libet credere hæc (Tyrriorum) gens literas prima aut docuit,
aut didicit. (Curtius, lib. vi, cap. 4.)

Phœnices primi, famæ si creditur ausi,

Mansuram rudibus vocem signare figuris.

(Lucan., lib. iii, v. 220, 221.)

[5] ἐπειδὴ φωντῷ ἄπειρον κατενόισεν εἴτε καὶ θεὸς ἄνθρωπος.
p. 23 (Plato in “Crat.,” vol. ii, p. 18, ed. Serran.)

[6] Quid illa vis, quæ tandem est, quæ investigat occulta? aut
p. 23 qui sonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis literarum notis terminavit? Philosophia vero omnium mater artium, quid

est aliud, nisi, ut *Plato* ait, donum, ut ego inventum deorum? (Cic. in "Tusc. Quest.," lib. i.)

[7] *Ibid.* "Natura Deorum," lib. iii.
p. 23

[8] Diod. Sicul., lib. i, sect. 1.
p. 23

[9] Plato, in "Cratyl.," ed. Fisc., p. 291. The origin of letters
p. 23 has engaged the attention and perplexed the sagacity of many learned men, and while some, considering this difficult subject, have freely confessed that it was above their comprehension, others have asserted that letters were first communicated to Moses by God himself, while others have even contended that the Decalogue was the first alphabetic writing. ("St. Cyril., contra Julian," lib. viii; Clem. Alex., lib. i, "Stromat.," c. 23; Euseb, "Preparat. Evang.," lib. ix, c. 7; Isidor., "Origin.," lib. i, c. 3; and many others among the moderns.) For the satisfaction of those who hesitate to adopt these opinions we will have recourse to the Holy Scriptures themselves, in order to see in how far they are founded. The first mention of *writing*, recorded in the Bible, occurs in Exodus xvii, 14: "*And the Lord said unto Moses, Write this for a memorial in a book.*" This command was given immediately after the defeat of the Amalekites near Horeb, and before the arrival of the Israelites at Mount Sinai. It seems that Moses understood what was meant by *writing in a book*, for in Exodus xxiv, 4, we find that he "*wrote all the words of the Lord,*" which was also done before the two written tables of stone were even so much as promised. Nor was it Moses alone who knew how to write, for in the directions given for the form of the holy garments, Exodus xxviii, the art is spoken of as a thing well known and in familiar use. So, verse 9, we read: "*And thou shalt take two onyx-stones, and grave on them the names of the children of Israel*"; and verse 11: "*With the work of an engraver in stone, like the engravings of a signet, shalt thou engrave the two stones with the names of the children of Israel*"; and again, verse 36: "*And thou shalt make a plate of pure gold, and grave upon it, like the engravings of a signet, Holiness to the Lord.*" And lest one may take exception

to the term “engrave,” we refer to the following texts: Deut. vi, 9; xi, 20; xvii, 18; xxiv, 1; and especially to Deut. xxvii, 3 and 8, in which the people are commanded to *write* the law on stones.

It is the term, “*like the engravings of a signet*,” which has given rise to some doubts as to the kind of writing used among the Israelites, and to the supposition that it might have been hieroglyphical, such as they had known in Egypt during the time of their captivity. But as the discussion of this question involves too great a number of collateral evidences to be brought forward here, the reader is referred to Hengstenberg, “Die Authentie des Pentateuches,” vol. i, pp. 415–502,” where the subject of the early use of writing in reference to its bearing on the antiquity and genuineness of the Pentateuch is carefully investigated.

As to the art of alphabetic writing being not of divine origin, but a human invention, the opinion of Galileo, indorsed two centuries ago by one of the greatest biblical scholars the world has ever produced, is too authoritative to be withheld. “Concludam verbis summi nostri seculi mathematici, et novorum inventorum gloria clarissimi, magni Galilæi, system. mund. in Colloq. I, dici ad finem: ‘Super omnes inventiones stupendas, qua ingenii eminentia fuit is, cui venit in mentem excogitare modum penitissimas animi sui cogitationes alii cuicunque communicandi, et si longissimo loci et temporis intervallo distanti, colloquendi cum his qui versantur in Indiis, cum his qui necdum nati sunt, nec nisi mille aut decies mille abhinc annis nascuntur? idque quanta facilitate? nimirum viginti characteres in charta, inter se varie fungendo: Esto hoc omnium admirandarum inventionum humanarum sigillum.’” (Walton, “Biblia Polyglotta,” 1657; “Prolegomena,” ii, § 1.)

[10] Boeckh, “Corp. Inscript. Græc.,” vol. i, p. 4, q. 22.
p. 24

[11] Josephus, “Contra Appion,” i, 2.
p. 24

[12] The *σήματα λυγγρα*, carried by Bellerophon (“Illiad,” vi, 168),
p. 24 were not letters, but have reference to pictorial characters.
Wolf, “Proleg.,” p. lxxxi, sq. 6.

- [13] Vico, "Scienza nuova." Wolf and Payne Knight, "Proleg. in
p. 24 Homer."
- [14] Plinius, "Hist. Nat.," vii, 56.
p. 24
- [15] Among the most remarkable monuments which have reached
p. 29 our time may be particularized the celebrated Rosetta stone,
the Eugubian tables, and the inscription of Bantia. The value
of the latter consists in their having preserved nearly all that we now
possess of the Umbrian and Oscan languages.
- [16] ἐς τοὺς ἄξονας. (Diog. "Laertius.")—Apud Athenienses ἄξονες
p. 29 erant axes lignei in quos Leges Solonis erant incisæ. (S-
capul. "Lexicon.")—In Legibus Solonis illis antiquissimis,
quæ Athenis Axibus Ligneis incisæ sunt. (Aulus Gellius, lib. ii, c. 12).
- [17] Proverbs iii, 3. Isaiah xxx, 8. Habakkuk ii, 2.
p. 29 Ezekiel xxxvii, 16.
- [18] The writing on table-books is particularly recommended by
p. 29 Quintilian ("Instit.," lib. x, c. 3). Ovid also, in his story of
Caunus and Byblis, mentions some particulars which illus-
trate this subject:
- "Dextra tenet ferrum, vacuam tenet altera ceram;
Incipit, et dubitat, scribit, damnatque tabellas;
Et notat, et delet, mutat, culpatque probatque,
Inque vicem sumptas ponit, positasque resumit."
- When epistles were written on tables of wood, they were usually
tied together with thread, the seal being put upon the knot; whence
the phrase, "Linum incidere," to break open a letter. Some of these
table-books were large, and perhaps heavy; for, in Plautus, a school-
boy of seven years old is represented breaking his master's head with
his table-book: "Priusquam septuennis est, si attingas eum manu, ex-
templo puer pædagogo tabula dirumpet caput." (Bac., scen. iii, 3.)

They were called *Pugillares*, some say, because they were held in one hand.

[19] Diodorus Siculus, lib. ii.
p. 29

[20] "Insanam vatem aspicias, quæ rupe sub ima
p. 30 Fata canit, foliisque notas et nomina mandat.
Quæcunque in foliis descripsit carmina virgo,
Digerit in numeram, atque antro seclusa relinquit. "

And Juvenal: ("Aeneid," lib. iii, 443.)

"Credite me vobis folium recitare Sibyllæ. "

"To *write a bill* and to *give it in the hand* of a person" (Deut. xxiv, 1) seems to imply that light and tractable materials were used for similar purposes among the Israelites.

[21] Diod. Sicul., lib. xi, c. 35. This sentence was termed *petalism*,
p. 30 from *πέταλον*, a leaf.

[22] Pliny ("Hist. Nat.," lib. xiii, c. 11, 13) asserts that the practice
p. 30 of writing on papyrus was known among the Egyptians three
centuries before the reign of Alexander. The name of *paper* is
derived from it.

[23] Du Halde, "History of China."
p. 30

[24] Montfaucon, "Palæograph. Græc.," lib. i, c. 2.
p. 30

[25] Hence the phrase, "Vertere stylum," to blot out. "Sæpe sty-
p. 31 lum vertas." (Horace, Sat. x, 10, 73.) The Greek word was
γραφίον, and was adopted by the Romans. "Quid digitos opus

est graphium lassare tenendo.” (Ovid.) Metal styles were dangerous weapons, and when their prohibition was found necessary by the Romans, those of bone or ivory were substituted in their stead.

[26] Pliny, “Hist.,” lib. xvi, c. 36; and Martial has these words:
p. 31 “Dat chartis habiles calamos Memphitica tellus” (lib. xiv, epigr. 34).

[27] St. Isidore, of Seville, who died A.D. 636, describes a pen
p. 31 made of a quill as used in his time: “Instrumenta scribæ calamus et penna; ex his enim verba paginis infiguntur; sed calamus arboris est, penna avis, cujus acumen dividitur in duo.” (Isid., “Hisp. Orig.,” lib. vi, c. 14.)

[28] Peter Caniparius, “De Atramentis cujuscunque generis opus
p. 31 sane novum: hactenus a nemine promulgatum,” London, 1660, 4to; and Weckerus, “De Secretis,” Basil, 1612, 8vo, are two curious works in which many interesting particulars concerning ink may be found.

[29] The celebrated “Codex Argenteus,” now at Upsal, is a well-
p. 31 known example.

[30] Several of these matrices are extant, which are cut out of or
p. 32 cast in one solid piece of metal.

[31] Probably on account of the scarcity of stone.
p. 32

[32] The “Historia Sinesis” of Abdallah, written in Persic in 1317,
p. 32 speaks of it as an art in very common use.

[33] Of such words was the word *cuckoo*, for instance, formerly
p. 37 spelled *cuckow*, in old English, *cuccu*, and yet existing with that sound in almost every language. In Latin it was *cuculus*

and *cuccus*; in Greek, κόκκυξ; in modern Greek, *koukkos*; in Italian it is *cucullo* and *cucco*; in Spanish, *cucú*; in French, *coucou*. In Danish it is *kukker*; in Swedish, *gök* and *kuku*; in German, *Kuckuck*; in Dutch, *koekkoek*. In Sanskrit it was *kukûha*; in Russian it is *kukushka*; in Polish, *kuhawka*; in Turkish, *ququva*; in Persian, *kôkau* and *kûkû*; in Armorican, *kuku*; in Basque, *cucua*; and in Hungarian, *kukuk*. Notice that in all these words the leading articulation is that of *k*, and the sound that of the English *oo* or *ou*.

[34] The word *concrete*, from the Latin *concretus*, means “formed
p. 37 by massing several things together”; applied to substantives,
it means those that denote objects having a real existence.
Abstract, from the Latin *abstractus*, which means “separate from
something else,” is said of substantives denoting objects that exist in
the mind only.

[35] The principle on which the dual number was introduced,
p. 48 and subsequently discontinued, may be thus explained: A
great many objects in nature as well as in art, and those in
which we are at an early period of life particularly interested, present
themselves to us in duals. Our hands, eyes, cheeks, shoulders, arms,
limbs, feet, are all twins. The natural relations of life present the same
dual aspect—father and mother, sister and brother, son and daughter;
and, in short, the relations of the sexes in the animated kingdom
generally exhibit this combination. Land and sea, heaven and earth,
east and west, north and south, are all correlatives. Many of the instruments
used by man are duals—a pair of pincers, tongs, scissors, snuffers, etc.,
and scales and balances, by which relative weight and value are ascertained,
are likewise paired. At the same time, it is manifest that as all duals are
plurals, and as plurals occur more frequently in nature than duals, the
plurals may be expected to supersede the use of the duals; and in most
languages this is actually the case. Nay, even in the Greek language,
where the dual has perhaps obtained the most permanent footing, the
plural is frequently made use of instead of the dual. In fact, this
refinement on numbers—for such it may be considered to be—seems to
have been felt at last to be in a great measure

superfluous, and so came to be gradually discontinued even in those languages where it once obtained an extensive use.

[36] In the midst of playful humor, a distinguished novelist has
 p. 49 proposed a theory on this subject, which seems to have a good
 deal of truth in it. "There is not a mystical creation, type,
 symbol, or poetical invention for meanings abstruse, recondite, and in-
 comprehensible, which is not represented by the female gender. There
 is the Sphinx, Chimera, and Isis, whose veil no man ever lifted; they
 are all ladies, every one of them! And so was Persephone, who must
 be always either in heaven or hell—and Hecate, who was one thing by
 night and another by day. The Sibyls were females; and so were the
 Gorgons, the Harpies, the Furies, the Fates, and the Teutonic Valkyrs,
 Nornies, and Hela herself; in short, all representations of ideas, ob-
 scure, inscrutable, and portentous, are nouns feminine." (Bulwer's
 "Caxtons.")

[37] Forasmuch as it has been disputed wherein *virtue* consists,
 p. 49 or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars,
 yet, in general, there is in reality an universally acknowl-
 edged standard of *it*. (Butler's Dissertation "Of the Nature of Virtue.")

[38] Mortals that would follow me,
 p. 49 Love virtue; *she* alone is free.
She can teach you how to climb
 Higher than the sphery chime;
 Or if virtue feeble were,
 Heaven itself would stoop to *her*. (Milton's "Comus.")

[39] An apostrophe usually indicates the omission of some letter
 p. 51 or syllable, but grammarians are not agreed as to what this
 apostrophe represents. Some, as Addison, think that it is a
 contraction for *his*, and they maintain that, had the possessive been
 native to the English tongue, we should not have met with such ex-
 pressions as "As *his* heart was perfect"; "For Jesus Christ *his* sake,"
 and the like. This theory has been refuted by the remark that while

it is easy to see how “the king *his* crown” might in course of time be contracted into “the king’s crown,” no possible contraction would account for the form “the queen’s crown” from “the queen *her* crown,” and the old form of the possessive *kingis* of the word *king*, and the like, have been brought forward to show that the possessive case was really of old English origin. This argument, however, is invalidated by the fact—1. That if this form at one period of English prevailed in the language, it was by no means universally so; 2. That many Saxon possessives, either singular or plural, do not terminate in *s* at all; and, 3. That the apostrophe *s* is now used with all nouns, whether their Saxon originals ended in *s* in the possessive or not. Whichever theory be adopted, it is clear that there has been an arbitrary transference of a contraction from a place where it was appropriate to one where it was not. The convenience of the contraction, from whatever it came, being seen in the case of nouns singular masculine, it was in course of time transferred likewise to nouns feminine and plural. This is not the only instance in language in which certain terminations have been, as it were, forced on words to which they do not naturally apply. (See Latham’s “English Language,” particularly the chapter on “Hybridism,” for fuller information on this subject.)

[40] So strong, however, is the tendency to abolish the distinction
 p. 55 between *two* and *more than two*, that very good writers occasionally use the superlative, distinctly referring to two; as, for instance, Goldsmith, when he says “Deborah exerted much sagacity in conjecturing which of the two girls was likely to have the *best* place and *most* opportunities for seeing good company”; and again, Scott: “The progress of reason and the principles of justice concurred to prove that a combat in the lists might indeed show which of the two knights was the *best* rider and the *stoutest* swordsman, but that such an encounter could afford no evidence which of the two was innocent or guilty.”

[41] Words having more than one meaning in one language have
 p. 59 often as many corresponding forms as they have meanings in another. The word *a*, when it means “one,” is rendered in

Latin by *unus*, as in the following example of Ennius: “Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.” When employed in its vague and undetermined sense, it is translated by *quidam*, or not at all; and when *one* is used in opposition, as in the expression, “One says yes, the other no,” it is rendered by *alter*. In the same way, the adjective “certain,” when meaning “true,” is translated by *certus*; when denoting some vague and undetermined unit, its Latin equivalent is *quidam*.

[42] M. de la Condamine mentions a tribe of savages, on the banks
p. 60 of the River Amazon, who have no numeral determinatives
beyond three, which number they express by the word *poet-
azzarorincouroac*.

[43] “The English verb,” says Crombie, “has only one voice,
p. 63 namely, the active. Dr. Lowth, and most other grammarians,
have assigned it two voices—active and passive. Lowth has,
in this instance, not only violated the simplicity of our language, but
has also advanced an opinion inconsistent with his own principles.
For, if he has justly excluded from the number of cases in nouns, and
moods in verbs, those which are not formed by inflection, but by the
addition of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, there is equal reason for
rejecting a passive voice, if it be not formed by variety of termination.
Were I to ask him why he denies *from a king* to be an ablative case, or
I may love to be the potential mood, he would answer, and very truly,
that those only can be justly regarded as cases or moods which, by
a different form of the noun or verb, express a different relation or a
different mode of existence. If this answer be satisfactory, there can
be no good reason for assigning to our language a passive voice, when
that voice is formed not by inflection but by an auxiliary verb. *Doceor*
[being an inflection of the word *doceo*] is truly a passive voice; but *I
am taught* can not, without impropriety, be considered as such.”
 (“Etymology and Syntax.”)

[44] This form of the verb often bears a *passive* signification, as
p. 65 “the house is building,” “a conspiracy is forming,” etc. Till
about a century ago it used to be the common practice to write

“the house is a-building,” “the conspiracy is a-forming,” and this mode of expression still prevails among the uneducated. Attempts have been made to establish another form, and to say “the house is being built” and “the conspiracy is being formed,” but it is not generally adopted.

[45] The French “*past indefinite*,” says Simonin, “corresponding
 p. 66 *in form* to the English *perfect*, denotes that the action is past and finished, whether within a period entirely elapsed; as, *J’ai étudié* hier mes leçons; or within a period of which some portion still remains to be completed; as, *J’ai écrit* une lettre aujourd’hui. In other words, it is used to express (1) what *took* place in time fully past, and (2) to express what *has taken* place in time not yet fully past. Hence it differs essentially from the English *perfect* in that the latter always conveys an allusion to the present time, denoting that the action or event, though by no means necessarily recent, *has occurred* in this century, year, month, week, or day, and that there still remains a part of the century, year, month, week, or day spoken of. Indeed, when a precise period of past time is alluded to or specified, the English *perfect* can not be used. Thus, it would be contrary to English grammar to say, ‘I *have seen* him yesterday.’—‘He *has suffered* a great deal last month.’ But in French it is quite correct to say, *Je l’ai vu* hier.—*Il a beaucoup souffert* le mois dernier.

“Yet, like the English *perfect*, the *passé indéfini* (*past indefinite*), as its name implies, may be used without allusion to any particular point of past time, and simply to express what still continues in its effects; as, *Il a beaucoup lu*.—*Il a beaucoup étudié*.—*Il a profité* de ses lectures.—*Il a réfléchi* toute sa vie.

“Again, like the English *perfect*, it is also sometimes used with reference to futurity; as, *Attendez-moi, j’ai fini* dans un instant.

“To sum up the foregoing remarks, the *passé indéfini* and the English *perfect* are exactly equivalent to each other in all respects save one, namely, that the latter can not be used when a precise period of past time is alluded to or specified, and the former can.”

Où *avez-vous vu* que les gens ruinés aient des amis? (“The French Verb.”)

[46] In French, the *past definite* is used to denote actions and
 p. 66 events that have occurred in the past with special reference to
 time, either expressed or clearly understood. *Rouget de l'Isle*
composa la Marseillaise en 1792. Louis XVI. fut décapité en 1793. La
bataille de Waterloo eut lieu en 1815. Dieu créa le monde en six jours.
 If, in referring to the past, the consideration of time is of minor impor-
 tance, the past indefinite expresses the idea. *Hier, en travaillant à mon*
quatrième dialogue, j'ai éprouvé un vrai plaisir. (Mirabeau.) *J'éprou-*
vai would have been the suitable form to express the sensation of a
 moment, a sudden pain or shock, for instance; but the use of the past
 indefinite indicates a persistent gratification. In the absence of all al-
 lusion to time the past indefinite alone can convey the idea correctly.
Toutes les religions et toutes les sectes du monde ont eu la raison na-
turelle. (Pascal.)

[47] “At first glance,” says Levisac, “there appears to be little dif-
 p. 66 ference between the *plus-que-parfait* and the *passé antérieur*.
 There is, however, an essential difference: namely, that
 the action or event expressed by the *passé antérieur* is subordinate to
 that which follows it, and to which the attention is chiefly directed:
 Quand j’eus reconnu mon erreur, je fus honteux des procédés que
 j’avais eus à son égard. I here intend to convey that I was *ashamed*,
 but not until after I *had perceived my error*; and that point I express
 by means of the *passé antérieur*. It is just the contrary with regard to
 the *plus-que-parfait*. For instance, if I say, *J’avais déjeuné* quand vous
 vîntes me demander, my wish is to signify that I had *breakfasted* and
 that then *you came*, and the attention is directed more particularly to
 the action expressed by the *plus-que-parfait* than to the fact of your
 arrival.”

[48] “A little reflection,” says Priestly, “may, I think, suffice to
 p. 66 convince any person that we have no more business with a *fu-*
ture tense in our language than we have with the whole system
 of Latin moods and tenses; because we have no modification of our
 verbs to correspond to it; and if we had never heard of a future tense in
 some other language, we should no more have given a particular name
 to the combination of the verb with the auxiliary *shall* or *will*, than to

those that are made with the auxiliaries *do, have, can, must*, or any other.” (“Rudiments of English Grammar.”)

[49] In inflected languages this idiomatic distinction can not be
p. 66 expressed, yet the future tense in them consists of two parts.

Thus the French *écrivrai* is resolvable into two distinct words, the infinitive *écrire* and *ai*, the present tense of *avoir*, forming together *écrire-ai*, “I have to write,” that is, “I shall or will write.” The same thing is equally true of the future in the Greek and Latin, though the truth is not so obvious.

[50] The translators of the Bible have sometimes observed the dis-
p. 67 tinction, and sometimes violated it. “Of the tree of the knowl-

edge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou *shalt* surely die.” One instance in which they have violated it is thus pointed out by Dr. Arnold. “If we speak of the great number of poor persons in England as compared with the rich, we are answered by a text of Scripture, misapplied as stray texts generally are, and are told that God himself has said, ‘That the poor *shall* never cease out of the land.’” This may be explained, however, by the fact that, in the time of the translators, *shall* expressed mere futurity. Dean Alvord says: “I never knew an Englishman who misplaced *shall* and *will*; I hardly ever have known an Irishman or a Scotchman who did not misplace them sometimes.” Still the following quotations are from English authors:

We shall now proceed to mention some of the most famous. ... I *will* begin with a passage of very considerable beauty. (Hallam.)

An extract from Mr. Hallam *shall* close the present section and introduce the next. (Latham’s “English Language.”)

I *will* not resist, therefore, whatever it is, etc., but *will* forthwith set down, etc. Brief I shall endeavor to be, etc. ... I shall detain you no longer, but conduct you, etc., where I *will* point you out, etc. (Milton.)

I *will* now for a moment go over to the position of an opponent, and state his argument for him. (Taylor’s “Man Responsible,” etc.)

Theocritus, in an epigram, which *shall* be cited in the next note, dedicates myrtles to Apollo. (Warton.)

By the fleet racers, ere the sun be set,
 The turf of yon large pasture *will* be skimmed;
 There, too, the lofty wrestlers shall contend.
 (Wordsworth.)

[51] Goold Brown, in his "Grammar of Grammars," says of it:
 p. 68 "The true subjunctive mood in English is virtually rejected by some later grammarians, who, nevertheless, acknowledge under that name a greater number and variety of forms than has ever been claimed for it in any other tongue. All that is peculiar to the subjunctive, all that should constitute it a distinct mood, they represent as an archaism, an obsolete or antiquated mode of expression, while they willingly give to it every form of both the indicative and the potential, the two other moods which sometimes follow an *if*," etc., etc. There seems, it must be confessed, a great tendency in English to avoid the use of the *subjunctive* altogether, and it looks very much as if it were doomed to destruction. Among writers of the present day we are constantly meeting with such sentences as these:

The writer's object is merely to amuse, and whether his story *happens* to be authentic or not, etc. (Arnold.)

If any sentiment *was* deeply fixed in him, that sentiment was, etc. (Macaulay.)

The audience listened with as much anxiety as if the fate of every one of them *was* to be decided by the verdict. (*Idem.*)

[52] To us who dwell on *its* surface, the *earth* is by far the most
 p. 73 extensive orb that our eyes can anywhere behold. (Addison.)

The leading principle kept in view throughout this work is, that *its* tendency to be useful to mankind at large, is the proper criterion of the propriety of any *action*, or the justness of any ethical *opinion*. (Burton's "Life of Hume.")

[53] *Men* of great and stirring powers, *who* are destined to mold the
 p. 73 age in *which they* are born, must first mold *themselves* upon it.
 (Coleridge.)

It rests on a *combination* of physical strength with diplomatic address, of perseverance in object with versatility in means, *which was* never before exhibited on the theatre of the world. (Alison.)

[54] They whose voices are heard the loudest are *so* foolish or *so*
p. 74 unprincipled *as* to make the triumph of either an object of just apprehension. (Arnold.)

All who wished for a change met with a gracious reception in her court, and their spirit of disaffection was nourished by such hopes and promises *as* in every age *impose* on the credulity of the factious. (Robertson.)

[55] Nor could Claudius think of indulging any private resent-
p. 74 ment, till he had saved an *empire*, *whose* impending ruin would crush both the army and the people. (Gibbon.)

We are the more likely to guard watchfully against those *faults* *whose* deformity we have seen fully displayed in another. (Whately.)

[56] *Un arbre dont le fruit est excellent.* (Laveaux.)
p. 74 *C'est un homme dont le mérite égale la naissance.* (Thomas Corneille.)

Ils se rappelleront celui dont ils les tiennent. (D'Alembert.)

Dieu, dont nous admirons les œuvres. Les héros dont il tire son origine. (L'Académie.)

[57] *Voyez ceci; examinez cela. Que dites-vous de ceci? que pensez-*
p. 74 *vous de cela? Ceci m'étonne, cela me surprend.*

[58] *Ce fut celui de tous les jeunes gens que j'aimais le plus.*
p. 74 (Fénelon.)

C'est celle qui demande à vous parler. Voilà ceux dont j'ai fait choix. Voyez celle-ci, examinez celle-là. (Laveaux.)

[59] Two negatives ought not to be used, unless affirmation is
p. 77 meant. In this respect Bacon, Shakespeare, and Locke, and indeed all our early writers, frequently offend. Usage was in

their times divided; but it has now become fixed, and that on the side of metaphysical propriety. Bacon says, "The joys of parents are secret, and so are their griefs and fears they can not utter the one, *nor* will they *not* utter the other." Shakespeare's "be *not* too tame *neither*," and "*nor* do *not* saw the air too much," are errors of the same sort. Goldsmith has frequently violated the idiom of the English tongue in this respect, although he has offended in good company: "Never was a fleet more completely equipped, *nor never* had the nation more sanguine hopes of success." *Never* should be *ever*. "He is *not unjust*" is right, if we mean to express much the same idea as is conveyed by the words, "He is just." By some it is maintained that this mode of expression strengthens the affirmation, and certainly it may do so in spoken language; but it more frequently softens the assertion, so as to make it less offensive or disputable. We have a beautiful instance of this in Macaulay's "History of England," where, referring to the "Paradise Lost," he characterizes it as "a song so sublime and holy that it would *not* have *misbecome* the lips of those ethereal virtues," etc. To have said "that it would have become" the ethereal virtues, would have been too strong; he therefore, with the art of a consummate master, says "would *not* have *misbecome*." It reminds us of the restrained boldness of the psalmist, when he says, speaking of man, "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels." (Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric.")

[60] *Un auteur qui n'écrit pas élégamment peut toutefois de temps p. 79 en temps rendre des pensées avec élégance. Résistez avec courage à cette tentation, et suivez toujours courageusement le chemin de la vertu. (Beauzée.)*

[61] The atrocious crime of being a young man, I shall neither attempt to palliate nor deny. (Pitt.)

In England, affairs took still a worse turn during the absence of the sovereign. (Hume.)

Upon this, however, it is not for us here to dilate. (Hallam.)

A master-mind was equally wanting in the cabinet and in the field. (Southey.)

The happy genius of Buchanan, equally formed to excel in prose and in verse, etc. (Robertson.)

This tragedy is alike distinguished for the lofty imagination it displays and for the tumultuous vehemence of the action. (Hazlitt.)

Thales was not only famous for his knowledge of nature, but also for his moral wisdom. (Enfield's "History of Philosophy.")

In following the trail of his enemies through the forest, the American Indian exhibits a degree of sagacity which almost appears miraculous. (Alison.)

[62] A blunder, of which the instances are innumerable, is the mis-
p. 80 placing of the word *only*. A few, taken at random from any book, will suffice to show the manner in which the word is used:

"The light, sandy soil of the hills *only* favors the fern."

"He was elected, but *only* was seen twice in the House."

"I *only* distribute them among the lower ranks."

"They *only* ceased when the day was closing."

In these cases, as in thousands of others that might be cited, the error consists in placing "only" before the verb, instead of after it; the grammatical effect of which is to make *only* apply to the verb, instead of to what follows the verb.

The meaning of the writer is that *only the fern* is favored; that the member "was seen *only twice*"; that the distribution was *only to the lower ranks*; and that "they ceased *only* when (that is, not until) the day was closing." (E. S. Gould, "Good English.")

[63] "Though the original use of prepositions was to denote the re-
p. 82 lations of place, they could not be confined to this office only.

They by degrees extended themselves to subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote relations as well *intellectual* as *local*. Thus, because, in place, he who is *above* has commonly the advantage over him who is *below*, hence we transfer *over* and *under* to *dominion* and *obedience*. Of a king, we say, 'he ruled *over* his people'; of a common soldier, 'he served *under* such a general.' So, too, we say, *with thought*, *without attention*, *thinking over a subject*, etc. All which instances, with many others of the like kind, show that the first words of men, like their

first ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible objects; and that in after-days, when they began to discern with their intellect, they took those words which they found already made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual conceptions.” (Hermes, book II, ch. iii.)

[64] In French almost all prepositions of one syllable are repeated
 p. 85 before their complements, whenever there are many, as: *La lecture sert à orner l'esprit, à régler les mœurs, et à former le jugement. La patrie a des droits sur vos talents, sur vos vertus, sur vos sentiments, et sur toutes vos actions.*

*L'homme de bien, modeste avec courage,
 Et la beauté spirituelle et sage,
 Sans biens, sans nom, sans tous ces titres vains,
 Sont à mes yeux les premiers des humains.*

(Volt., “Nan.,” act I, sc. i, 113.)

The repetition of the prepositions *en* and *de* may be dispensed with in making enumerations.

*Toujours logé en de très-beaux châteaux
 De princes, ducs, comtes et cardinaux,
 Il voit partout de grands prédicateurs,
 Riches prélats, casuistes, doceturs,
 Moines d'Espagne et nonnains d'Italie.*

(Voltaire.)

[65] Antiochus ... Tauro tenus regnare jussus est. (Cic., “Pro
 p. 85 rege Dejot.,” 13, 36.)

Aqua Trebiæ erat pectoribus tenus. (Livy, 21, 54, 9.)

Quibus de scriptum est. (Cic., “De Invent.,” ii, 48, 141.)

Quos ad ... (Cic., “De Nat. Deorum,” ii, 4, 10.)

Hunc post ... (Cic., “Quæst. Tusc.,” ii, 6, 15.)

Hominem propter. (Tacitus.)

[66] ἄρμα Διομήδους μέτα. (Eurip., “Alcest,” v, 483.)

p. 85 πῦρ πνέουσι μυκτῆρων ἄπο. (Id., v, 493.)

Ἰθάκην κατά κοιρανέουσιν. (Hom., “Od.,” 1, 247.)

In Attic prose only *περί* is so found, but this very often.

πρώτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισμοῦ πέρι. (Plat., “Rep.,” v, p. 469, B.)

ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω. (Plat., "Apol.,"
p. 19, C.)

τούτου σφι ἔμελε πέρι. (Herod., vi, 101.)

[67] Er lebte seinem Stande gemäß sehr einsam. (Goethe.)

p. 85 Auf's erste danke ich meinem Gott durch Jesum Christum euer aller
halben. (Luther.)

[68] *Etant donnés A B, B C, C D, construire un triangle.* A B, B C,

p. 90 C D seinen die Seiten eines Dreiecks.

[69] "Some languages are more *elliptic* than others, that is, the
p. 90 habits of thought of some nations will bear the omission
of certain members of a sentence, better than the habits of
thought of other nations. In English we should say, 'At the Equinox
the sun rises at six and sets at six.' But if we were speaking in French,
we should say, '*At the time of the Equinox the sun rises at six hours of
the morning, and sets at six hours of the evening.*' Now here there is no
doubt that the Frenchman has the advantage in fullness and propriety
of expression. Any one disposed to cavil at our English sentence might
say, 'rises at six and sets at six! Six what? Six miles, or six minutes,
or six occasions?' But we do not in practice thus cavil, because we are
in the enjoyment of common sense, and we are prepared, in the daily
use of our language, to omit that which the thought would naturally
supply." (Dean Alford, "A Plea for the Queen's English")

[70] Dean Trench, "English Past and Present."

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[71] Bain, "English Grammar as bearing upon Composition."

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[72] Latham, "History of the English Language."

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